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1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE. 1825/1.

Mr. S. H. Perowne

to Mr. Bowker.

25th December 51.

R. 1st Jan. '52

Proposing that we should try to secure Arab support for

1) The Blandford "Homes & Jobs" plan and the resolution on the UNRWA report.

2) The "Compensation plan" and

3) The resolution on the Palestine Conciliation Commission Report.

Last Paper

EE. 1821/128 (1951)

References

98508

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

Next Paper

(Minutes)

See within

5/1.

37330

Ent E.

E

Reference Mr. Perowne's letter attached.

The proposal is that we should, through His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East, try to secure Arab support for

(1) The Blandford "Homes and Jobs" plan and the resolution on the UNRWA report.

(2) The "compensation plan" and

(3) The resolution on the P.C.C. report.

On (1) Mr. Evans will be able to advise. I am not sure what Mr. Perowne means by (2), but assume he is referring to the P.C.C.'s compensation assessment of £120,000,000 to be paid by Israel to such refugees as do not return to their homes. Frankly I do not think we shall be able to get the Arab Governments to commit themselves on this point, which is one for negotiation between the P.C.C. and the conflicting parties, and not for open debate. The figure does not appear in the draft resolution on the P.C.C.'s report.

As regards (3), I see no harm, and some advantage, in letting the Arab Governments know the way we are thinking. (The Israelis have been told of paragraph 5 of Asdel telegram No.228 saving). Subject to Mr. Evans' views on (1) I suggest that we should let Middle East posts have the text of the latest draft (Asdel. telegram No.243) and instruct His Majesty's Representatives, without revealing the existence of the draft, to explain and seek support for our views. The main objection from the Arabs is with regard to the "primary responsibility" of the governments to reach a settlement, but the draft does not specifically enjoin them to engage in direct talks with Israel. Also with regard to the need for a settlement of differences "in a spirit of justice based on realistic considerations and mutual concessions".

It does not seem necessary to seek the concurrence of the Americans, etc; any approach we may make will be exclusively a United Kingdom affair, explaining the United Kingdom point of view. We should however let them know what we are doing, and express the hope that they may take similar action.

P.R. OLIVER
29/12.

Mr. T.E. Evans (first).

I think it might do more harm than good for us to try to gain support for the UNRWA resolution in the Arab capitals. Mr. Blandford has succeeded in securing general and vague blessing for his plan. If we flog it, the Arab Governments may get suspicious. Sir H. Knight agrees.

My feeling is that the same applies to the P.C.C. resolution.

T.E. EVANS.
29/12.

I/

I have discussed this further with Mr. Evans, who has made the following additional points:-

(1) The Arab Governments thinking on the Palestine problem is pretty static and they are unlikely to respond with any speed to approaches made to them.

(2) There is a great deal of background to the problem which it would be impracticable to communicate to His Majesty's Representatives in the time at our disposal, and without which they would be on dangerous ground in making the suggested approach.

On re-consideration I agree with Mr. Evans that we should not pursue the suggestion further.

P.R. OLIVER
29/12.

I also agree with Mr Evans, and - what is more important - so does Sir Henry Knight.

James C Wardrop
31/12.

I also agree - I spoke to Mr. Perowne today accordingly. He seemed to accept our views.

R.G.B
31/XII

Eastern Dept. - for obs.
R.J.S.
28/xii

Malvern, as from
Travellers' Club
Christmas Day, 1951

EE 1825/1

My dear Bowker,

I would not worry you with affairs during your all too short holiday, only there is one matter which is pressing. I should have thought of it before.

2. When we reassemble in Paris, we have to deal in the Ad Hoc committee with Libya and Palestine, as you know. Libya may lead to some hostile speeches, or it may not; but it does not seem likely to lead to anything else. The country is independent, and so, as

regards the future, UNO will have no more authority over it than over any other member State.

3. Palestine is quite different. Here, we want to obtain favourable and as far as we can, active backing for the Bland ford Scheme. It is vital, because it concerns the welfare and lives of human beings; and we must muster every available force to get it going. There is bound to be a good deal of talk about it, and no doubt hard things will be said. I don't think we can expect much enthusiasm among the Arabs for it; but at least we must try to reduce, by every available means, actual obstruction.

4. Last week, you were able, by very quick and energetic intervention, to prevent the so-called Saudi-Arabian Delegation from supporting Salah-ad-Din. By the time we reassemble, all that can be done

with Pharaoh will have been done. The Iraqis & the Lebanese are friendly and I think that anything they can give they will give. Nevertheless, they, too, are always glad to have the support of their Governments and particularly on such a controversial subject. The Yemeni will presumably follow the Saudi-Arabian, as usual. The Egyptian is out of reach for the present, and that leaves the Syrians. So far as I at present know, the Syrian delegation, which was appointed by a government which has disappeared, has never received any orders at all from Damascus. This means that old Khoury does just what he likes. On Palestine he is quite venomous. His aide is Ahmed Shuqeiry, a very able man, a refugee himself. He is an old friend of mine. Azzam says (or said last week) that he wd not be in Paris for the Palestine item, but wd "leave it to Shuqeiry" who although a Palestinian, is not only a Syrian delegate, but Azzam's deputy.

5. It therefore occurs to me, with great respect, to wonder whether it would be possible (a) to put to the Arab Govts, on broad lines (i) the main points of the Blandford plan, and why, without prejudice to compensation and the ultimate right to repatriation, Blandford's "Homes and Jobs" scheme is in the best interests of all concerned, refugees and states alike, (ii) the compensation plan. (b) to ask the Arab Govts if possible to instruct their delegations to further the plan by voting for the Resolution; if not, to instruct them not to obstruct it. If the same can be done for the PCC Resolution, so much the better.

6. I don't think there are many subjects about which I would trouble you at Christmas-time; but I think that for writing on this one, you will forgive me.

Much looking forward to seeing you both on New Year's Day.

I am

Yours

Edward Boyle

RECEIVED IN C.O.
-1 JAN 1952
SENT TO DEPT.
4/1

27th - Travellers Club (Bill. 67)
28th - 30th, Rufford Grange, Ollerton, Newark
31st - 1st Travellers' Club

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

EE 1825/2

F.O. Minute
Mr Evans.

D. 6th February.

R. 6th February.

Syrian Ministers views on the Refugee question.

Conversation with Syrian Minister.

M. Homsy.

Last Paper

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

D(t) Sir H. Knight.
Beirut.
from Mr T Evans:
6th Feb

(Action completed)

M.J. 8/2.

(Index)

Jo 28/4

Next Paper

(Minutes)

M. Rhofac Rut 7/2

19 7/2

37021

EE 1825/2.

(EE 1825/2)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

6th February, 1952.

I have had an opportunity of discussing the refugee question with the Syrian Minister here and I think it may be useful for you to know his ideas.

2. M. Homsy said that the new United Nations Resolution should be followed up without delay by an approach to the Syrian Government. The support which all the Arab delegations had given the Resolution and the cordial relations which had developed in Paris between the Arabs and the sponsors of the Resolution would make it easier for the Syrian Government to take constructive action.

3. M. Homsy went on to say that the recent decision of the Syrian Government to distribute state lands might be a useful lead in for the Agency. The state lands that have already been developed by private enterprise would no doubt go to those who had worked on them. A great deal of the state land, however, was undeveloped and needed capital to make it productive. This was where the Agency might come in.

4. I have no doubt that Blandford, who I understand returned to Beirut immediately after the refugee Resolution was passed in the Plenary, will lose no time in making an approach to the Syrians. I assume too that you will keep in close touch with His Majesty's Minister at Damascus (to whom I am sending a copy of this letter), in case you and he consider that there will be advantage in Blandford being given support at the diplomatic level.

(T. E. Evans)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I.,
[illegible] C.I.E.,
Beirut.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/3.

Sir H. Knight,
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

9. 2. 52.
16. 2. 52.

Negotiations with Arab Governments.

Reports on Mr Blandford's meeting with Col. Shishakly on 5th Feb. Discusses the Lebanese attitude.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

see -/4

-/4 2/2

References

E 1825/2.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

(Index)

fo 28/4

Next Paper

37021

Finlay

Beirut. 9.2.52.

My dear Evans.

E 1825/3

YOur EE 1824/2 of 6.2.52.

Blandford had over an hours talk with Col Shishakly on 5.2.52 who appeared to be friendly and asked what projects could be started in Syria and what funds would be available. He (the Colonel) said perhaps more money would be needed and added that he was anxious both to work with the other Arab State and with UNRWA. He would arrange a further discussion with Bla-ndford, himself and Colonel Selo for either today or Monday. He emphasised however that the conversations were informal and that any schemes would have to be worked out with the Governmen

I shall be going to see Montague Pollock as soon as I kn-ow the result of Blandfords second visit.

Blandford has had interviews with Chas Helou in Paris and with Fouad Ammoun and Georges Bey Haimari here and explined that UNRWA is an asset to the Lebanon and should get better treatment than hitherto. Blandford seemed to think he had converted them but what the rest of the Lebanese Government thi- does not yet appear. But at Blandfords suggestion the Lebaese authorities have apparently warned Emil Ghori that they do not approve of his subversive activites among the refugees.

I shall get to Amman as sson as practicable, but the weather ever since I got back has been storms and rain and shows little sign of change. I've not dared to see conditions in any of the tent camps!

yours sincerely

HMG

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/4

Sir H. Knight,
Beirut.
To Mr Evans.

12. 2. 52.
16. 2. 52.

Negotiations with Arab Governments.

Reports Mr Blandford's meeting with Cols. Shishakly & Selo. The latter raised various objections to Syria helping the refugees.

Last Paper

References

EE1825/3.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes)

This is fairly encouraging.

Col. Selo's interest in industrial development should be noted. If this is maintained, it is an added reason for an early start on the Youssef Pasha Hydro-electric project, which will provide power for industrial expansion in Northern Syria as well as for pump irrigation in the ~~[illegible]~~ Euphrates valley.

[signature] 21/2

Eastern Dept.
(M. Rhodes)

P.M.R.
21/2

CW 22/2

(Action completed)	(Index)
[signature] 22/2	[signature] 28/4

Next Paper

37021

Secret.

Beirut.

12.2.53.

E 1825/4

My dear Evans,

In continuation of my last letter, Blanford yester-
-day saw Col Shishakly, who then took him in his offical car to the office of the Head of the State and was present while Blanfford had anhour and a quarter interview with Col. Selo. The latter was not well informed about the refugee problem and raised various objections to Syria doing anyhting for the refugees, e.g. that the funds provided are insufficient, that all the State land is required for Syrian nationals and that UNRWA will have to buy any land wanted for refugees, that Syrian development must be industrial and the refugees must be settled in Industry, etc. Blandford said that Selo's arguments were confused and he gave the impression of posing as an ecomonic expert while know-
-ing nothing of the matter. Shishakly took no part in the discussion but watched Selo, and when Blandford left, Shishakly took him to the door and said that he hoped that Syria would be able to do somthing for the refugees.
Selo has asked for schemes or a plan, and Blandford hopes to see him again shortly. Blandford's view is that Syria still may play, but that it means delay in getting things started there, and that Shishakly is really anxious to help for whatever motive it may be. (Presumably the answer is Arms.)
Depage, our Syrian no 1, has a scheme for building a refugee village on an estate which needs tenants and believes he has the Syrian Govt's agreement to this.
I hope to write more after seeing Montagu Pollock, but the road is probbly closed today, Blandford only got back with difficulty last night.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/5

Mr Montague-Pollock,

DAMASCUS.

To Mr Evans.

18202/15/52.
18.2.52.
23.2.52

Negotiations with the Syrian Govt.

Comments on the meeting which Messrs Blandford & Depage had with Col Selo on 11th February.

Copied to Sir H. Knight.

Last Paper

References

EE 1825/2

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
[signature] 28/2	[signature] 28/4

Next Paper

(Minutes)

H.M.M. & the U.S. Minister are probably right that the time has not yet come for diplomatic support. If & when it does come, the French Minister's support will, I think, be the most valuable

[signature] 27/2

M. Rhifdes

yes PMR.
28/2

37330

Finter

CONFIDENTIAL.

18202/15/52

British Legation,
Damascus.

E.

18th February, 1952.

E 1825/5

Dear Evans,

Your letter EE.1825/2 of February 6th to Sir Henry Knight about Homsy's ideas on the new refugee Resolution.

2. Blandford and Depage saw Silo on February 11th, and Depage has given Lambert, in strict confidence, an account of the meeting.

3. Shishakli, who had earlier told Depage that in his opinion reintegration was the only long-term solution to the refugee problem, accompanied Blandford and Depage, ostensibly to help them plead their case with Silo. He added archly that as he was only the Chief-of-Staff, his word might not cut much ice with the Head of State on a political matter!

4. Silo maintained a cautious and suspicious attitude throughout the meeting. He displayed a good deal of ignorance of the economics of the refugee problem, and gave the impression that if Syria did not close the door entirely it would be as a gracious concession on her part. However, he did agree to consider, without commitment, a reintegration plan for Syria based on State-owned lands, to be prepared by Blandford as soon as possible.

5. While I appreciate Blandford's desire to get down to brass tacks with the Syrians as quickly as possible, I am far less confident that he will succeed. The Syrian Government are much occupied at present with internal problems, and they are not going to be rushed over other matters. Still less do they show themselves keen to commit themselves in the international field. In these circumstances I think it would be a mistake for me to endeavour to force the pace. Blandford has not asked for diplomatic support from me or from my U.S.colleague, and we are both opposed to giving it at this stage. Incidentally, I am extremely doubtful whether Homsy knows much about the policy of the present Syrian Government. I believe he has never met Shishakli, and it is unlikely that the latter has taken him into his confidence.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Knight.

Yours ever,
Montague-Pollock

Trefor E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1825/6

Sir H. Knight,
Beirut,
to Mr Evans.

19/2/52.
23/2/52

Negotiations with Syrian Govt.

He has discussed with Montague-Pollock, Cannon & Depage, the need for diplomatic action to induce the Syrian Govt to take up the refugee question.

Last Paper

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes)

See -/5

M. Rhofer
P.M.R.
28/2

[illegible] 27/2

(Action completed)	(Index)
[illegible] C 29/2	[illegible] 28/2

Next Paper

37330

Secret. E 1825/6 Beirut. 19/2/52 Enter E 1

My dear Evans.

I am having to deal withthis at home if I am to catch the bag and you may or may may not be able to read it!

I was in Damascus yesterday and talked with Montague Pollock, Cannon and Dr Depage, our UNRWA officer there, about the present situ-ation there as far as refugees are concerned and can now answer yo your letter about the need for diplomatic action to induce the Syrian Government to take up the refugee question.

I am sure that at present it would be unwise to raise the matter throughx the various missions. From what I gathered the present position is probaly something like xxxxthis. Themilitary Government is anxious not to commit itself to any definite action unless and intil it has made up it's mind on what it wants to do and can be certain of public absence of opposition. At preset x it does not knowwhat it should do about the refugees. Shishakly in private conversations seems to admit that the refugees will never return and that many ought to be sttled in Syria, which needs half a million more population. Selo in his interviews with Blandford and talk with others xxxxxxx has emphasised that Syria wants no refugees and will give the land in Syria to Syrian nationals only. In particular he stated recently that Syria wanted no help from outside and would live it's own life even if that meant tightening it' belt. In interviewsbetween Blandford and Selo and between Cannon and Selo, Shishakly was present and said practically nothing.

The question at present unsolved is whether Selo is Shishakly's stooge or whether Selo thinks that he is boss and can dispense with Shishakly. If the former, it is possible that Shishakly at these inter-views has set up Selo to put up the objections to the settlement of refugees and other matters merely to elicit the arguments on the other side which will be useful in influincing public opinion to come round to Shishakly's real view of cooperartion with UNRWA etc. If the latter, Selo presumably thinks that he can take over and run Syria, andxfromxallxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx having managed to

divert an adequate xxxx proportion of the Syrain Army from support Shishakly to support of himself. From all accounts Selo is a conceited and stupid person, and I do not know which view is correct. Montague Pollock and Depage dont know, Cannon thinks from his intelligence that Shishakly and Selo have not parted company, but that they would like to get rid of the dictatorship and return to the safer cover of pseudo-popularly elected democratic and constitutional facade of Government; after all a number of popularly elected deputies are a less obvious target for a bullet than a dictator. Also they have not made up their mind what they and the Army really do want and until that is decided, they will merely keep things and decisions pending until they can work public opinion into agreement with their views when and if they decide what these are going to be.

In any case at present their policy...or of course it may be Selo's...is to have as little help from the outside as possible, the USA have I gather offered very favourable terms for Mutual Security Aid and the Syrian Govt have not yet replied, except for Selo's public speech against foreign aid.

Cannon told me he took a more optimiistic view of the prospects of Syrian cooperation with the West and incidentally with UNRWA than Montague Pollock does, but also added that unlees one took a optimiistic xxw view one would never get anywhere!

From what I heard yesterday and after talking it over with Myers who was several days in Damascus last week, my guess is that there is no split between Shishakly and Selo, that the presemt Syrian Govt is not willing to come out into the open until it is sure that public opinion is with it, and at present the Govt does not know what it does, want, that xxxx

we have, is the supply of arms, which I gathered from Montague Pollock HMG is not at present in a position to make, and that therefore at present any how no diplomatic intervention is likely to be of any use. Per contra, especially from what Depage told me, I conjecture that unofficially the Govt is not opposed to setttling refugees and that Shishakly and the Director Generals who now act as Ministers are in favour of it, if it can be done without exciting popular attention. In particular Depage is hopeful of a number of schemes for settling refugees as tenants on landlords' land and is taking up almost at onee the building of a village for 50 refugee families near I think Selemiya. If this be a success, he anticipates that the other refugees will at once demand of the Syrian Govt why they also cannot be given a house and a job. I personally agree with Depage and you that the gradual infiltration of refugees is our best hope in Syria,—though large scale settlement on State lands would be wonderful.

Incidentally Depage told me he has the promise of land from tha army for starting a technical training school as well as a number of requests from landowners for help to imrove land and settle refugees, and hopes that, provided the Govt Departmental Committee agree, these can or some of them will go through on the on the quiet.

Generally there seems a chance that if UNRWA can devise some means of making it appear that the Syria

If UNRWA is to get anything done it looks as though it will have to do it in a way which will allow the Syrian Govt to keep up its facade of xenophobia and demand for the destruction of Israel and [illegible] objection to western economic penetration, which may tax the ingenuity even of Blandford and Adcom! Meanwhile there is n no alternative except to go cautiously and not hurry the bird into t the decoy.

Depage says that the refugees now realise that they will not return to Palestine in the near future (but that they are determined

later to return and drive the Jews into the sea by armed force.)

What is really needed is for the other Arab States to bring pressure to bear on Syria in their common interest, for I cant see how the N.E. is to settle down until the refugee problem is settled and on that seems to depend the continued existence of several of the present States....but once again one is up against what Dow call-ed the "marmoreal impercipience of the Arab."

Meanwhile I hope to get Depages infiltration schemes pressed, though I gather that the State Dept wants large scale frontal attacks to impress Congress.

This is somewhat an incoherent letter but I am typing against the bag. I think it had better be "off the record".

yours sincerely.

H. Trevor

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/7

FROM

Sir H. Knight, Beirut. to Mr Evans.

No. AC. 202.

Dated

Received in Registry— 5 April. 16 April.

REFERENCES

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Col. W. Russell Edmunds Tsy.

Copy) Amman. 8th May

(Action completed)	(Index)
SS 21/5.	30/5.

Negotiations with Arab Govts.

Encloses copy of a note of 1st April by Mr Blandford containing a proposal for Advisory Commission consideration on negotiations with Governments.

MINUTES

Enclosure 1 — the Agency's Memorandum to the Syrian Govt — should, I suggest, be copied to the recipients of Beirut tel No. 218 (of April 18th) which reports the Syrian Government's agreement to negotiate on the basis set out in it.

The emphasis placed by Mr Blandford on the desirability of building up intermediate organisations between the Agency & the Governments seems very sound. It is to be hoped that the Agency will be prepared to take into consideration the experience of the Sudan in this direction. I am getting pp about the Arab Land Development Co.

The possibility of a large scale resettlement programme in Syria will now make it important that the Agency should get the Syrian Government's agreement (hitherto withheld) to the appointment of a senior Regional Director for Syria. The present acting Director, Dr. Depage, is a Belgian doctor, an ex-Communist, who is excellent at handling the Syrians but has little administrative sense. If a Frenchman is appointed (& the French will press very strongly for this) can we be certain that

39213

the land settlement schemes etc will be on the right lines?

The statement in para 17 of enclosure 2 that the Country Representatives will be given a very wide responsibility in ~~carrying on~~ connection with the carrying out of projects, is ~~do~~ important in this connection.

Mr Blandford's efforts to infiltrate refugee labour into Iraq seem sound. As regards Libya, another report from the Agency (see EE 1822/3) states that the Director of the Point IV programme in Libya is shortly arriving in Beirut to recruit refugee technicians for the carrying out of that programme.

C Watkins
21/4

E. Dept.
African Dept - P.3

Sir H Knight has since sent us a paper giving more specific proposals as submitted to the Syrian Govt. (It was referred to in Beirut tel No 218) Pl attach -/9.

Eastern Div. [signature] 21/4

The more specific paper No 30 (on -/9) refers to this paper No 28 which should therefore be photostated & copies sent to the Trsy (Col Russell Edmunds) & Chancery (Amman)

M.E.S. again (a.a.) [signature] 29/4

[signature] 14/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

Secret. Beirut.

5.4.52

(AC2[redacted]

E

My dear Evans

~~xxxxxx~~ I enclose a copy of a "very confidential " note from Blandford. It has not not yet been considered by the AdCom, but should come up on Tuesday. As I propose to go ~~xxxx~~ to Damascus Wednesday mornong I send this now as I m may not have time to send comments before the bag goes on Wednesday.

The important parts are the two enclosures which give policy of UNRWA for the future, but we got this too late for me really to digest it by now.

yours sincerely,

E 7825/7

25

Sir Henry Knight P.d.C. 200

English
Copy No. 10

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 28

1 April 1952

Subject: Status of Negotiations with Governments

Since our last meeting there have been generally sustained good relations with Governments and, broadly speaking, some measure of progress. I am summarizing below the events of this period with the intention of providing a supplement of more intimate detail at the time of our next meeting.

Lebanon

We have come out of a period of small-scale controversy into a general era of good relationships. The Government is convincingly working with us to implement the program in the context of its very special position. There is now a special committee, consisting of the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Central Committee for Palestine Refugees and the Director of UNRWA, to review major problems of relationships between the Government and UNRWA and generally to consider how Lebanon can help implement the program. The Government is much more actively concerning itself with the refugee attitude toward the program and, we understand, has discussed ways and means of implementing the new program with the other Governments. For reasons familiar to all of us, the Agency does not have reintegration projects in Lebanon. Conceivably we may shortly raise with the Government the possibility of some training projects.

Syria

The Advisory Commission will recall that General Selo at the last conference asked to be given a memorandum on the new program. After some preliminary explorations and discussions, such a memorandum was presented to the Chief of State, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum. The presentation was made quite informally so that there would be large opportunity for adjustment if necessary. There followed a two-hour conference with General Selo, in which Dr. Depage, the Director of PARI and the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs participated. The details of this conference I would prefer to give orally, but it may be safely stated that considerable progress was made. The General stated that the Agency has the highest confidence

/of his

26

of his Government. He revealed that he had read the memorandum carefully; he discussed the political situation frankly and indicated clearly to the Agency the nature of the next steps which he thought should be taken. Dr. Depage and the Director of PARI, since the conference, have been working closely to prepare a more detailed presentation for the next meeting.

Paralleling this effort, Mr. Robbins of our Education Division and his deputy have been spelling out a series of educational projects with the Syrian Ministry of Education and the Director of PARI.

It is very important that these current negotiations continue to move forward with a minimum of publicity and a maximum of understanding of the problem of refugee attitudes.

Jordan

Over the weeks there has been a bit of guerrilla warfare between the Agency and the Government over personnel matters, international and local. We are confident that they can be resolved, but it must be conceded that the controversy has been distracting. This factor, plus the long stormy winter months, has contributed to a disappointing slowness in achieving momentum on the new program. A fresh spring drive in the fullest spirit of cooperation is of the highest priority. We hope within the next week to spend a sustained period in Jordan to be certain every possible bottleneck is broken.

We have received the oral approval of the Jordan Government for a general outline of a program which approximates $ 15 million. This is subject to individual Government action as each project is ready for initiation. The Country Representative has been told to push forward as fast as possible and carry each project to the point of Government approval. Meanwhile the program is being reviewed by Headquarters and by the Jordan Minister of National Economy. These two considerations will provide a basis for inviting Advisory Commission comment, possibly at our next meeting. In the meantime, no time need be lost in pushing forward on the initial stages of the projects. There are still important discussions to be held in Jordan which will more conclusively determine the respective roles of the UK loan, US technical assistance and the new UNRWA program.

In response to a request of the Minister of National Economy, a memorandum was distributed in Jordan which attempts to summarize the Agency's new program. A copy of this memorandum is attached.

..... (2)

Iraq

The Country Representative has long been instructed to explore discreetly the possibility of gradual introduction of artisans needed by that country in its expanding program of economic development. Furthermore, we have suggested that he consider the possibility of a small suburban housing scheme for such artisans. As an extra effort, we have sent Mr. Schuller to Baghdad with more detailed instructions and asked him to join with our Country Representative in a thorough review of possibilities of small beachheads for the new program.

/Egypt

Egypt

At a conference in Cairo with Cherine Bey and our experts it was agreed that exhaustive exploration had not been successful in finding water in the approved area of exploration. There is still a possible reconnaissance effort in another area of the Sinai, but we may safely assume that opportunities for the new program in that area are not likely to be found. The Country Representative is now discussing with the Egyptian Government possible smaller projects in Gaza and along the coast. There is also consideration of possible project areas in the Western Desert. The Government and UNRWA agree that it is highly desirable to identify one or more projects, of whatever size, which may symbolize continuing cooperation.

Libya

A representative of the Agency is making a final round-up, especially in the light of the change in Government, and will report back shortly after further conferences in Cairo with our Country Representative and possibly a representative of the Arab League. We are still hopeful that we may have some program activity in that country.

General

Discussions in Cairo with representatives of the Arab League continue to indicate that there is full understanding and support for our effort. There is a sharing of the feeling that the problem ahead is principally one of helping refugees fully to understand the opportunities of the new program in terms of helping themselves to be self-supporting and independent of relief while the political problems are being worked out.

Another interesting development is that we have been exploring the possibility of creating intermediate organizations between the Agency and the Governments to carry out the new program. These might include refugee training institutes, loan societies, development corporations and so forth. Relevant to this line of exploration has been the proposal by Arab Land Development Company as an agent for the new program. Discussions with this agency are being held, and they are being urged to discuss with Governments the acceptability of such an approach.

John B. Blandford, Jr.

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB:ep

Distribution:

Director - Copy No. 1
Deputy Director - 2
Legal Adviser - 3
Reports Officer - 4
Adcom - 5 through 15

(Translation)
VERY CONFIDENTIAL

Enc. No. 1

MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW PROGRAM

The objective of the new program is to help refugees become self-supporting and obtain adequate housing.

The old program of relief served to sustain life, but after three years of camp life and ration lines there is large agreement that something more constructive is needed.

Refugees should live better while the political problems are being worked on. They should be able to accumulate some capital. They should become independent of voluntary relief contributions, which are increasingly difficult to obtain. They need not be an economic blight on countries which may act as their hosts.

Refugees can enjoy these benefits without prejudice to their interests in repatriation or compensation. They can become self-supporting and still retain full freedom to take advantage of political solutions.

The program does not in fact reintegrate. Reintegration can take place only when refugees and Governments agree. The program proposes that refugee living conditions be improved pending those decisions.

On these premises the General Assembly unanimously approved the new program of assistance. Over a period of approximately three years declining voluntary contributions for relief are to be offset by large-scale investments to help refugees become self-supporting.

The Program

There is large flexibility and discretion for Governments and the Agency to work out a program which meets the needs of refugees as related to the economies of the host countries and take them off ration lists. The sole objective is to make refugees self-supporting within a reasonable period at a reasonable cost. It is expected that the program might develop along the following lines:

Refugees can be helped to find employment which does not compete with nationals, especially on construction projects under the new program.

Refugees can be given training which will prepare them for jobs under the new program or for positions in the economy where there is a shortage of skills -- for example, motor mechanics, teachers, medical assistants, etc.

Refugees can be given loans to set them up in small enterprises which are needed in the program projects or which are considered by the Government as helpful to the economy.

Larger industrial schemes might be helped in various ways, such as housing facilities or investment in proportion to refugee employment opportunities.

/Housing

Housing for refugees might be built around cities or villages if the Government determines that there is suitable employment and that the refugees could come off the ration lines.

Private lands could be improved through the building of housing or villages and by land improvements under conditions which the Government and the Agency had agreed were in the refugee interest.

Public land areas could be improved by housing and irrigation works with an opportunity for refugees to support themselves and contribute to the economy.

Generally, land and water development schemes might be helped where the Government considered it appropriate that refugees participate in the benefits.

The above is a general outline of how large-scale economic investment might be made in the interest of the refugees. The Agency is confident that the Government experts will have many constructive projects to suggest.

General Arrangements

The following points are offered as a basis of discussion as to how the program will be carried out. Obviously any arrangements must be subject to Government approval. In fact, the Agency looks to the Government for the principal suggestions as to suitable arrangements:

The Agency is prepared to assume necessary responsibilities over such a period of time as is required for the effectuation of the program of refugee self-support. This, of course, is subject to the wishes of the Government and to review from time to time by the United Nations.

The Agency would prefer to have arrangements with a minimum of involvement in direct or detailed operations. Insofar as possible, the Agency would like to be in the position of contributing funds or experts as required. It does not wish to build up a large administrative staff or have a large payroll or procurement responsibilities.

The Government, it is hoped, would participate to the maximum extent. The Government, it is assumed, would approve the general arrangements and would establish a committee to review projects. To the maximum extent, the use of Governmental experts would be desirable. The program would be greatly facilitated through the help of Governmental services and the availability of public lands.

Perhaps a convenient arrangement would be the creation of intermediate organizations to carry out the program. This would avoid direct involvement of the Agency and the Government. It might be more acceptable to refugees, and to the general public. In some appropriate manner, not only representatives of the Government but also representatives of refugees might be associated with such organizations.

/If this

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If this idea of intermediate organizations is acceptable, there might be such organizations as the following:

1. A refugee service center that would know refugee skills and be informed as to opportunities for their employment.

2. A refugee training center which would utilize and expand existing educational facilities to help refugees acquire skills and education which would make them self-supporting.

3. A refugee loan organization to receive grants from the Agency in order that it might make loans for establishing refugee enterprises.

4. Private land development associations for working out arrangements with private landowners which would help refugees to become self-supporting.

5. Public land development corporations to carry on schemes for large-scale investment in public projects which would benefit refugees.

The general objective would be to create agencies acceptable to the Government and the Agency which would invest funds to make refugees self-supporting. Insofar as possible, refugees should feel that such agencies were their own agencies and in no manner interfered with their interests in repatriation and compensation.

Refugees should feel that they are free to take with them their savings. They should realize that their new skills and tools are movable and that new enterprises can be liquidated or transferred. Refugees should understand that the new housing projects and villages, as well as the commercial and agricultural developments, are properties of the state usable by them so long as they wish and Governments agree.

Definitely, it is the plan that the new facilities shall become the property of the state or of the intermediate corporations for current use or the future ownership of the refugees as political circumstances may determine.

Reasonable arrangements might include loans to refugees and use of property on a rental basis. Repayment of loans and payment of rents might be effectively used by the various corporations or area development companies to expand the projects or to assist refugees when they are in need. Such funds could be very large in amount.

Economic Implications

Syria is a country of rich natural resources and may reasonably expect to double the standard of living of its citizens within the lifetime of the present generation. Some surveys have suggested that the present population is only one-half of that required to exploit the country's full potentialities in natural resources. In short, Syria has enormous economic opportunity for agricultural and industrial development, given the manpower and the capital.

/In the field

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

In the field of agriculture, great expansion has taken place in the growing of wheat and cotton, but there has been the constant limitation of manpower. Lack of housing and other facilities has often meant migratory laborers returning home after a season under tents or, alternatively it has meant transient laborers moving by trucks at double the daily rate of pay common in other districts. Generally it is reported that there are large land holdings, old and new, awaiting capital for improvements and stabilized manpower. Of course it follows that from the new production and additional export will flow the foreign exchange requirements of new industrial development. Here, too, in terms of an expanding economy, there will normally be large need for new and specially skilled manpower.

Surely, economists will agree that skilled Palestinians backed up by new economic investment can constitute a definite economic investment during the period of their stay. They should both add to the national wealth and improve their own economic position. Those who later depart leave behind them a contribution to the economy and tangible physical assets. Those who may stay continue to contribute and add to their contribution the value of any compensation that they may receive.

The Agency investment in physical facilities -- wells, irrigation arrangements, housing, community facilities, villages and small industries -- remain. The projects will have back of them their earnings for expansion and help to refugees. The Government receives substantial taxes, and the country economy benefits from increased foreign exchange earnings. Properly guided industrial projects might in return reduce expenditures on imports. To the maximum extent possible, there can be local procurement and the use of local contractors. Generally there should be large secondary beneficial effects on the economy resulting from the large-scale expanded use of Agency funds.

Immediate Opportunities

Refugees can begin to benefit from the new program immediately after general arrangements have been made between the Government and the Agency. Detailed agreements are not needed. Nor is it necessary that there be public announcements or widespread publicity.

Substantial funds are at hand. More funds will follow immediately when it is evident that there are opportunities to spend them. In fact, the one necessary condition to assure that present contributions are not lost and that next year's much larger needs are fully pledged is to start projects.

Total requirements and individual refugee requirements are needs which will become clearer as projects are started and experience is gained. The funds required to take refugees out of camps and off rations lines and to make them self-supporting and economic assets need not be confused with the question of ultimate compensation of Palestinian property owners. Also, there has been large agreement that the new facilities for refugee families should be properly related to corresponding facilities for families of nationals if criticism is to be avoided.

/It is hoped

ERY CONFIDENTIAL

It is hoped that there might be general agreement on a first stage of the program with an immediate start on specific projects. There is wide range of choice of projects. It is expected that the Governments will have many suggestions. The only basic guide is that projects should benefit those refugees who are now temporarily housed and receiving rations.

Discussion with the Government can quickly outline an acceptable first-stage program. Solely to illustrate the possibilities and to stimulate such discussion, the following is offered:

A Palestinian refugee educational center for financing and guiding training projects	$ 2,000,000
A refugee loan society to establish refugees in suitable small shops and trades	1,000,000
An industrial bank to finance small industries using refugee skills	3,000,000
A suburban housing corporation to provide a small number of suburban dwellings adjacent to cities where there is need for refugee skills	2,000,000
A private land development company to make arrangements with private landowners	7,000,000
An agricultural development corporation to carry on similar projects where suitable public lands may be available	5,000,000
A start on a single large-scale undertaking involving major irrigation works might be developed with related villages and improvements for refugee families	10,000,000
	$30,000,000

It is repeated that the above is merely illustrative. There may be better opportunities to help the refugees. There may be other forms of intermediate organizations. The Agricultural Bank of Syria might be used. It has also been suggested that the services of the Arab Land Development Company are available. The Government may wish directly to carry on some part of the program. The Agency could initiate projects in order to get a quick start while waiting for other arrangements.

There are many possibilities. There is a large reservoir of suggested projects.

The Agency respectfully awaits the wishes of the Government.

JBB:ep
21/3/52

PROGRAM NOTES

1. The general outline of the new program for helping refugees to become self-supporting and to enjoy better living conditions is presented in the report of the Director and the Advisory Commission to the General Assembly.

2. This program developed out of discussions with Arab Governments, was endorsed with certain explanatory comments by the Arab League and was adopted unanimously by the United Nations.

3. The essential point of the program is that refugees are to be helped to leave camps and ration lines and become self-supporting without prejudice to their interests in repatriation and compensation.

4. The United Nations Assembly agreed to sponsor a request for voluntary contributions over a period of three years in an amount of $ 250 million -- $ 50 million for the old program of relief and $ 200 million for the new program of self-support.

5. The relief funds are small in amount and difficult to obtain. The self-support fund is large and, for the present, has wide support. The declining contributions for relief need to be offset by a rapid acceleration in project expenditures which will make refugees independent of relief.

6. No one can make a satisfactory case as to whether the amount is adequate or not until the program is much further along. In any event, contributors cannot be asked to discuss additional contributions until the funds now in hand are utilized or committed.

7. Dividing any total sum of contributions by a total number of refugee families is not helpful. Some energetic and skilled wage-earners find support for their families at no cost to the program. Others may be established in essential trades at a cost of a few hundred dollars per family. Some agricultural or industrial projects may cost much more per family.

/8. An important

8. An important decision, agreed to in many discussions with Arab leaders when the program was being developed, was that refugee families should not have living facilities conspicuously superior to those of nationals of the countries concerned.

9. Another premise of the program is that the funds should be so expended that the benefit to refugees is directly traceable and results in a specific reduction in expenditures for relief. In other words, it was not intended that the program funds be poured into a general fund for economic development in the hope that refugee families would benefit.

10. Parenthetically, the latter policy would be especially hazardous in Jordan where the number of refugee families which can be made self-supporting is limited. Inevitably such a policy would result in a permanent burden of semi relief cases totalling half a million persons rather than an economic asset of a smaller number soundly self-supporting.

11. It follows from the above that the Government and the Agency need specific projects which promise to make specific numbers of refugees self-supporting at costs which are normal to the economy and which are related to the estimated amount of voluntary contributions available for the whole job.

12. The projects may be of great variety and scope, but generally they may be grouped in two categories:

A. Where the Agency assumes the full cost of the project and refugee families receive the full benefits;

B. Where the Agency contributes a portion of the total cost and refugee families share proportionately in the benefits.

In each category, the estimated cost per refugee family should meet standards discussed above.

/13. Generally

13. Generally speaking, the Agency's program and the estimates contemplate concentration on small projects or supplements to large projects on the premise that large projects would be intended largely to benefit nationals and would be financed from other funds. However, there is no barrier to Agency consideration of large projects if the costs are within the range of the Agency budget and if the benefits are intended for refugees.

14. Broadly speaking, the voluntary contributions to the Agency program are intended as grants. However, it is generally agreed that the device of loans, properly and occasionally used, can make the program more effective and multiply its benefits.

15. Important considerations as to loan policy are that the proper expenditures be not competitive with private capital, that refugee families be equitably treated and be stimulated to maximum enterprise, and that projects or development agencies to the extent possible have reserves for expansion or emergencies.

16. It is the intention of the Agency that its Country Representatives will be adequately staffed and fully authorized to act with respect to projects. Headquarters will periodically allot funds to the Country Representatives on the basis of periodic programs or general categories of projects. Occasionally a special or unusual project will require Headquarters review.

17. In carrying out the program, the Agency wishes to avoid as much as possible becoming involved in direct operations. It hopes for a maximum of governmental responsibility. An alternative might be the use of banks, development companies, loan societies, cooperatives, training institutions and the like to carry out projects.

The above are intended to be the principal points of the program as developed in discussions with Governments and among the staff, the Director and the Advisory Commission of the Agency.

In any one country, their application is, of course, subject to the consideration and agreement of the Government.

JBB:ep
25/3/52

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1825/8.

FROM

Mr Chapman-Andrews, Beirut.

No. 218.

Dated

Received in Registry— 18.4.52. 19.4.52.

REFERENCES

EE1826/18

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Copied Mr Scarpell, T.Sy. Mr Harris, T.Sy. Amman. 19/4. (in dept.)

Tel Beirut 309 19/4.

Rpd Damascus 181 W.Va 1738(S) UKDel, N.Yk. 281(S) Amman 34(S) 19/4

(Action completed) 21/4

(Index)

Negotiations with Syria.

Brig. Selo has told Mr Blandford that he is willing to exchange letters forming an over all agreement for settling in Syria 500,000 refugees from Jordan, Lebanon & Gaza over & above 80,000 now in Syria. Discusses the various comments re. his motives.

Rpd Damascus, W.Va, N.York.

MINUTES

Copies sent to Mr Scarpell & Mr Harris in the Treasury, & to Amman.

Reply sent. CW 19/4

39318

E 1825/8

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Chapman Andrews
No: 218
18th April, 1952.

D: 11.30 a.m. 18th April, 1952.
R: 12.41 p.m. 18th April, 1952.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 218 of 18th April
Repeated for information to: Damascus.
and Saving to: Washington. U.K.Del. New York.

From Knight.

N/2.

My letter to Evans ACS/3 of 15th April. Selo has told Blandford that he is willing to exchange letters forming an over-all agreement for settling in Syria 500,000 refugees from Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza over and above the 80,000 now in Syria.

2. Selo wants very early agreement on general lines to which annexes on specific projects will be added from time to time. First annex would be the thirty million dollar programme referred to in my letter. Selo indicated that in view of the coming election he and Blandford should sign as soon as possible letters of agreement which he was sure would be honoured by later Government.

3. In the thirty million dollar programme Selo wishes one million dollars to be subtracted from the private land settlement and added to education, making the programme of education five, loan S.1. private land development four, Government land development scheme twenty. In view of the larger programme now suggested, the increase in education is justified especially as education is most attractive to refugees and the Syrians and according to Bergus the Americans complain of UNRWA's small educational programme.

4. Bergus considers Selo is attracted by the large sum concerned and would ask for a proportion of the Agency's total fund proportionate to the number of refugees settled in Syria. Selo also hopes that other funds for general Syrian development may be channelled through UNRWA presumably referring to the Bilateral Aid Fund.

5. Selo is.....

SECRET

Beirut telegram No: 218 to Foreign Office

5. Selo is extremely anxious for secrecy over the proposal, to avoid trouble with refugees and the public. He will probably let the education plans be known first.

6. The French member agreed only with reluctance to the expenditure on primary and secondary education and the Turkish member thinks Syria has no intention at all of reintegrating refugees but merely wants to get educational facilities at UNWRA's expense. Bergus says that the United States will almost certainly agree both to the thirty million dollars and to the larger programme, as it is anxious to have funds committed.

7. There were statements in the Syrian Press and Radio yesterday that the Government was opposed to resettlement, but this may perhaps be a smoke screen.

8. I consider UNRWA should take this apparent opportunity despite this risk.

9. ADCOM meet tomorrow Saturday 1600 [? grp. omitted] to see draft of letter for Bergus to present to Selo on [grp. undec. ? Monday]. Selo had asked for this tomorrow or Sunday. If the draft seems adequate I propose to agree to it as a basis for discussions with Selo unless contrary instructions are received.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and U.K.Del. New York as my saving Nos: 6 and 1 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and
U.K.Del. New York].

DISTRIBUTED TO:
Eastern Department.
Middle East Secretariat.

ADVANCE COPY:
Middle East Secretariat.

JJJJJ

CYPHER

Registry No. EE1825/8

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~ Secret
~~Confidential.~~
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Telegram. TO BEIRUT

No. 309

(Date) 19/4/52

Repeat to :—

Damascus 181

Saw 1738 Washington (Saving)

Saw 281 U.K.Del.

281 New York (Saving)

~~Amman Saving~~

19/4

39 SAV

R.J. Bowlaw 19/4

~~En Clair.~~
~~Code.~~
Cypher.

RECEIVED IN C.B. 21 APR 1952 SENT TO DEPT.

Distribution :—

Dept.

E.M.E.S.

11am 19/4/52

Copy to
Mr. Harris
Treasury.

There is a risk but in the circumstances we think it should be taken ~~along~~ provided we keep our eyes open

Mr Gerpell

Copies to :

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(13556) Wt. 43697-140 100m 3/47 G.S.St. Gp 620

Emergency ~~IMMEDIATE~~

F.O., 19/4 19.4 1952

Despatched 12.10 P.M.

SECRET ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTFILE

Addressed to Beirut

telegram No. 309 (date) 19th April

repeated for information to Damascus and saving to Washington ~~and~~ U.K.Del. New York and Amman

Your telegram No. 218 [of April 18th. Refugees.]

Following for Knight.

Opportunity of securing an exchange of letters recording Syria's agreement to settle 500,000 refugees from Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza over and above the 80,000 now in Syria should not be missed. In itself it would considerably strengthen the Agency's position ~~vis a vis~~ in relation to the Syrian and also the other Arab Governments and the refugees.

2. The education programme might well be the best way of starting the process of moving refugees from other countries to Syria, which is bound to meet some resistance from the refugees and possibly some Arab governments

3. If the Syrians do not honour the agreement, funds can, as you say, be withheld. Clearly the agreement must provide for the gradual release of funds as projects are carried out. We also assume that what is now envisaged is agreement in principle in respect of the programme as a whole and that individual projects will be examined in detail by the agency and the advisory commission.

Distributed to Eastern Dept. M.E. Secretariat

R.J.B. 19/4

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BEIRUT

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP and by bag DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 309

19th April, 1952 D. 12.10 p.m. 19th April, 1952

EMERGENCY
SECRET

Addressed to Beirut telegram No. 309 of 19th April
Repeated for information to Damascus
and Saving to Washington No. 1738
U.K. Del. New York No. 281
Amman No. 39

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2. The education programme might well be the best way of starting the process of moving refugees from other countries to Syria, which is bound to meet some resistance from the refugees and possibly some Arab Governments.

3. If the Syrians do not honour the agreement, funds can, as you say, be withheld. There is a risk but in the circumstances we think it should be taken provided we keep our eyes open. Clearly the agreement must provide for the gradual release of funds as projects are carried out. We also assume that what is now envisaged is agreement in principle in respect of the programme as a whole and that individual projects will be examined in detail by the agency and the advisory commission.

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Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat

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1952

PEE

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

PME

E E 1825 | 9

Sir H. Knight,
c/o Beirut
to Mr Evans.
AC 100/3
15-4-52.
21-4-52.

Negotiations with Syria.

Encloses copy of Mr Blandford's proposals to the Syria Govt for the expenditure of 30 million dollars in the next three years.
Copied) Damascus, W. Van.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Copy to Chancery Amman & Tsy (Col Russell Edmunds), & resubmit pl.

[signature] 23/4

[signature] 21/5

References

-/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)

S) Tsy (Col. Russel Edmunds)
Copy) Amman 26 Apl.

(Action completed)	(Index)
[signature] 24/5	[signature] 30/5

Next Paper

34092

(AE100/3)

E 7825/9

Secret

Beirut. 15.4.52

My dear Evans.

I enclose a copy of Blandford's proposal no 30 to the Advispry Commission that a scheme shpuld be put up to Col Selo for the expemditure by UNRWA of 30 million dollars in thenext three years. It is based on recent discussions by Blandford with Selo, and by Dr Depage, UNRWA representative in Syria, with some of the Syrian Departmenal heads now acting as Ministers. And Blandford is putting it to Selo today or tomorrow.

The scheme proposes the expenditure of the following.

Education	4.m. dollars
Industrial and Commercial Loans	1.m
Private Land develop--ment	5.m.
Public Projects	20.m.

Of course criticism of the prpposals is easy, for instance, no educational programme can rely on providing self support for 3,000 families without an extensive survey of opportunities for employment in Syria. But the figure is that estimated as the number who should find jobs as a res-ult of the vocational training suggested. And we have no factual basis to say that this estimate by the Educational Division of UNRWA is wrong.

Under education it is assumed that half of the pupils will be refugees now in Syria and the other half refugees from outside Syria.

Again there seems no guarantee that Syria might not take advantage of the funds which UNRWA might have provided for school etc buildings and after three years divert the buliding and equipment to non-refugees, even though there might still be many refugees left in Syria, or that Syria might not play the educational game from which it would have considerable benefit, and procrastinate about everything else and no real resettlment of refugees be accomplished.

13

The answer to this would be that long before we have gone the whole hog on the educational programme, we should have learnt what Syria's real intentions about the rest of the programme are and could stop the educational part.

Similarly as regards the proposal to have no written detailed agreement with Syria about the general scheme, and possibly not about some of the individual schemes, we have got to take a chance. I should think that there is no chance of Selo signing any document such as Point IV have in Jordan. Selo is insistent that no publicity is wanted, and I fear that the best we can expect is that we cut off expenditure if we find that Syria is not fully cooperating ...but as we recognise that it is a gamble that seems enough. In any case however I dont suppose that any written document would prevent Syria doing whatever it might want against UNRWA.

The object of the proposal is to make 20,000 families self supporting, and if after agreeing to put it into force Syria lets UNRWA down, the UN would have a valid reason for giving up providing relief to refugees in Syria.

Of course Selo though he has I understand approved the proposal in principle and his people have in draft, may turn the whole thing down. Then we shall be where we are now. But if he agrees to try it I think we must go on and see if it can be worked.

I should be glad if you would let me know if you agree, I dare not express an opinion as to Selo's sincerity on my own knowledge. But if he wants Western money probably he thinks UNRWA easier meat than USA, and UK has little for him. Meanwhile UNRWA like Mahbub Ali must "catch at windy chances" of getting anything done.

yours sincerely,

H Knight.

PS I am sending copies to Montague Pollock and Greenhill, as the USA are even more concerned with it than us, as it must be mostly their money.

14

Ad.C. 209

Eng. copy No. 10

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 30

Subject: Progress in Syria

Recently I forwarded to the Advisory Commission Proposal No. 28 in which I summarized the status of the new program in various Arab countries. Specifically, I emphasized the Syrian scene in the form of an annexed memorandum which had been discussed with General Selo.

Subsequently I informally sent to the Advisory Commission a memorandum from Dr. Depage on a draft program for Syria, to which were attached annexes on education, industrial and commercial loans and private land projects. This material from the Country Representative was worked up in consultation with representatives of the Syrian Government and also representatives from our Headquarters Education Division.

I am now sending you this Proposal No. 30 with comment and recommendations. The material from Syria informally presented to you should now be considered as attachments to this present proposal. The Agency urgently needs the advice of the Commission as a basis for another conference to be held Monday, 14 April, with the Chief of State of Syria. Needless to say, we are dealing with a matter of highest interest and priority and, happily, at the moment in an encouraging environment.

1. I am sure the Advisory Commission understands that we are feeling our way into an understanding with the Syrian Government as to a program on which we can work together. Necessarily, in large measure our approach is exploratory and, within reason, in a pattern of adjustment to the Syrian viewpoint. In such a setting we cannot expect full firmness nor conclusive detail. We can at this stage trace the general outline of a program which we are willing to finance. The Director needs a reasonable area for maneuver, always of course faithful to our frame of reference.

2. Presumably when and if we reach agreement with the Syrian Government we will, by an exchange of letters or perhaps some less formal means, define a program broken down into major categories of projects. Faithful to our concept of decentralization, the implementation of the program will take place at the country level through agreement between our Country Representative and the Government on specific projects.

/3. Our Country

3. Our Country Representative has given us considerable material in support of a program of approximately $ 30 million. This material was prepared under considerable pressure and can, upon the basis of further study, be adjusted and better summarized. It should be understood as a front-line product of exploratory negotiations. It is especially necessary that there be now a new summary and interpretative comment.

4. In this proposal I am attempting this new summary as a basis for Advisory Commission comment prior to the Monday meeting. Again I suggest that we are attempting to identify a general outline of a program without attempting to determine detail. The summary below is derived from the material received from Syria. There are adjustments as the result of further consultations and also because of a somewhat different approach.

Three-Year Program
for
Self-Support for 20,000 Families

Education		3,000 families
Primary and secondary	$1,000,000	
Basic and adult	775,000	
Agricultural training	730,000	
Technical training	585,000	
Training center for girls	220,000	
Higher education	616,000	
Equipment	250,000	
	$4,176,000	$ 4,000,000
Industrial and Commercial Loans		1,000 families
Industry	$ 825,000	
Transport	50,000	
Commerce	20,000	
Services	59,000	
Professional	21,000	
	$ 975,000	$ 1,000,000
Private Land Development		3,000 families
Various projects		$ 5,000,000
Public Projects		13,000 families
Agricultural development		$20,000,000

5. In summary, the proposed program totals $30 million and, hopefully, makes 20,000 families self-supporting over a period of approximately three years. It is to be noted that there are approximately 16,000 families in Syria now on rations. Therefore, the program, if agreed to, would take care of all refugee families in Syria, plus approximately 4,000 more.

/6. The Agency

of which 1500 will be absorbed as a result of education & training, a total of 3000 to be absorbed.

16

6. The Agency is spending approximately $ 2.5 million a year on relief for refugees in Syria. In the negotiations with the Government an effort would be made to obtain from the Government an agreement that, by one device or another, these relief payments would gradually decline and, in fact, cease at the end of three years. Such a proposal is of course contemplated by the new program and, especially in the case of Syria, is perhaps acceptable. Aside from the large expenditure on new projects, /~~it~~/ /which/ should result in self-support. There seems to be general agreement that, ~~probably~~ in Syria, many of the refugees are presently employed, at least on a part-time basis.

7. We also wish to call attention to the general balance among the various categories. Generally it tends to reflect the fact that our refugees are preponderantly of agricultural background and that urban opportunities for refugees should not be unduly stressed until the pace of general economic development in Syria quickens. I think we are properly concerned that the new program of self-support be not competitive in the urban market place.

In translating the Syrian pounds as shown in the annexes into dollars, we have used the factor of one to four. With respect to cost per family, the program averages out at about $ 1,500. We hasten to add that such averaging is a bit hazardous, and generally we tend to discourage it when attempted by Governments.

8. A special comment should be made on the educational category of the proposed program. In the first place, there have been adjustments after consultation with our Headquarters Education Division. In the second place, the general philosophy is that the Syrian Government will assume full responsibility for administration of the educational program, including the current program of elementary education. Thirdly, in terms of self-support, half of the beneficiaries are to come from outside Syria. The intent is to merge the refugee educational program with the general Syrian assistance to education. The Agency would provide funds and technical assistance.

There is also a basic consideration with respect to our use of reintegration funds. In Proposal No. 29 I raised this question, especially with respect to education, and presumably we will have had a general discussion. The essential point here is that this program assumes that all the refugees in Syria would be embarked upon or committed to this new program of self-support. On this basis we could determine that reintegration funds were available for the entire educational effort. In fact, we might carry this principle to the extreme of agreeing that the entire care of refugees might be paid for out of the new fund. Whether we follow this principle in whole or in part, it should be noted that only within such an approach can we agree with the Syrian Government on projects totaling almost $ 2 million in the field of primary, secondary and adult education.

9. Another conspicuous feature of the $ 30 million program is that $ 20 million of it would be concentrated on one of possibly two large projects. In many ways this

/is very

is very appealing. Clearly it would represent genuine economic development and a field of agricultural development where we need large outlets for the new program. Secondly, while large projects require considerable time for completion, there is opportunity for large employment on construction and, more importantly, there is opportunity for large-scale arrangements for carrying out the project. The Agency and the Government by suitable contracts could launch such undertakings without deep involvement in the complexities of Agency operations.

10. While the proposal extends over a period of three years and covers fully the needs of Syrian refugees, it is obviously only a first step. Once agreed upon and well launched, the Agency can immediately move toward new negotiations for much larger sums of money directed towards new development projects promising self-support for refugees outside Syria.

John B. Blandford, Jr.

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB:ep

1952

PME

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

PME

E E 1825/10

Sir H. Knight
Beirut.
to Mr Evans.

AC.100/3A.

23. 4. 52.
26. 4. 52.

Negotiations with Syrian Govt.

Encloses copies of two letters to be handed to the Syrian Govt by Mr Blandford re. the settlement of 500,000 refugees in Syria.

Copied) Damascus, Amman.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

Copy enclosure (photostats within) to M. O. L. Williams (Treasury)

Pitt R. 9/5 [signature] 9/5

Eastern Dept { M. Rhodes
M. Gavey 9/5
M. Warfish } 10/5.

References

-/8

Photostat copy of letter dated 21st April 1952 to Mr O. L. Williams. Treasury. E.W. 9/5.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

8J 14/5

(Index)

[signature] 30/5

Next Paper

34092

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

(AC 100/3A)

SECRET

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

23rd April, 1952.

E

E E1825/10

EE1825/8

My dear Evans,

In continuation of my telegram No. 218 of 10th April regarding settlement of some 500,000 refugees in Syria.

2. I enclose copies of the letters to be handed to the Syrian Government to-day.

3. I enclose also these in French as the French text will presumably be definitive, Syria having asked for the letters in that language.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Montague-Pollock and Furlonge.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

COPY

Very Confidential

21 April, 1952.

Excellency,

May I convey to Your Excellency my great appreciation for the opportunities you have granted recently for discussion of theproblem of the Palestine refugees and for consideration of arrangements whereby the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency might cooperate to improve refugee living conditions.

Pursuant to these conversations, I am setting forth below the principal facts of the new programme of refugee assistance and the principal arrangements which it is believed would facilitate the execution of the programme:

(1) The United Nations Assembly Resolution 513 (VI) unanimously approved a new Programme designed to assist refugees to become self-supporting within a period of approximately three years and urged Governments to contribute $ 200 million for this programme. Additional contributions of $ 50 million were approved for refugee relief on a declining basis over the same period.

(2) A basic premise of this new programme is that refugee participation in the programme shall in no way prejudice refugee interests in repatriation and compensation.

(3) The programme is to be implemented by projects which will provide self-support for refugees by means of employment, training, loans, housing, industrial and commercial enterprises, and development and cultivation of lands. A detailed outline of the programme is presented in the 1951 special report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the Agency to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(4) The two hundred million dollar programme is intended to help some 150,000 refugee families to become self-supporting. The contributed funds will be expended in countries approximately in proportion to the number of families which are assured opportunities for self-support.

Syria has indicated a willingness to receive a total of approximately 125,000 families. For projects to accommodate this number of families, the Agency envisages expenditures in Syria of approximately $ 170 million plus an appropriate part of the funds available for relief.

#166.65

His Excellency General Fawzi Selo
Head of the State and Prime Minister,
Syrian Republic,
Damascus.

(5) In the implementation of an approved programme it will be the constant effort of the Agency to provide self-support for refugees in a manner which will be of maximum benefit to the economy of Syria. Consistent with the programme purpose, the Agency will make maximum effort to utilize experts and general employees, products and services from the Syrian economy.

(6) In turn, the Agency requests that the Government of Syria maximize the benefits to refugees by making grants of public lands, by reducing the cost of imported commodities through waiving of duties and taxes, and generally by services and arrangements which will facilitate the operation of the Agency and its personnel.

(7) Further, the Agency assumes that the Government of Syria will make appropriate arrangements with the refugees who may choose to enjoy the benefits of the programme in Syria and also with the Governments of the countries in which the refugee presently reside in order that refugees' movements and their full participation in the programme will be helped.

These seven points are presented Your Excellency with the hope that they may meet with the approval of Your Government and with the willingness that they form the firm framework of a cooperative programme of assistance to the refugees.

The Agency would be honoured to receive a letter of approval from Your Excellency and would consider the exchange of letters as constituting a basic agreement between the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

Such a basic agreement can then be implemented by annexes which, from time to time, will record agreement on main categories of projects and actually launch the programme.

With the expression of my highest esteem,

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency,

Yours very truly,

John B. Blandford
Director, UNRWA

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
NATIONS UNIES OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE

Telephone : 97-22 to 97-27
Cables : UNRWA

Maison UNESCO
BEYROUTH

TO BE WRITTEN IN FRENCH

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

21 April 1952

Excellency,

The basic agreement recently concluded between the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency proposed a series of annexes as the method of implementing the agreement.

As a result of conferences between representatives of the Government and of the Agency, the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency are now in agreement on the content and conditions of the first annex to the basic agreement as follows:

1. The Government approves and will cooperate in carrying out a program to provide self-support for approximately 20,000 refugee families during a period of approximately three years, to be financed out of funds contributed to the Agency in an amount of approximately $ 30 million.

2. The Distribution of funds shall be approximately as indicated below in terms of program categories and number of families benefited:

	Families	Dollars
Education	3,000	5,000,000
Industrial and Commercial loans	1,000	1,000,000
Private Land Projects	3,000	4,000,000
Public Land Projects	13,000	20,000,000
TOTAL		30,000,000

His Excellency,
General Fawzi Selo
Head of the State & Prime Minister
Syrian Republic
Damascus.

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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES
NATIONS UNIES OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE

Telephone : 97-22 to 97-27
Cables : UNRWA

Maison UNESCO
BEYROUTH

3. The figure of 20,000 families is intended to include the number of refugee families now in Syria and an additional number - approximately 4,000 families - which may choose, with the approval of the Government of Syria, to come to Syria to become self-supporting through participation in the program.

4. On the premise that the 20,000 families are entering upon the new program of self-support it is agreed that a portion of the $ 30 million funds may be expended on education, health and welfare services during the period of preparation for self-support.

5. The various categories of this program annex are to be implemented by specific project agreements entered into between representatives of the Government and of the Agency. A project agreement will describe in detail the scope of the project, the plan of expenditure, and the arrangements for construction, operation and utilization by the refugees.

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency,

With expressions of my highest regard,

Yours very truly,

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB/adh

Le 21 avril 1952.

Excellence,

Je tiens à vous remercier ici d'avoir bien voulu m'accorder récemment la possibilité d'examiner avec vous la question des réfugiés de Palestine et d'envisager les mesures qui permettront au Gouvernement de l'Etat Syrien et à l'Office de collaborer à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des réfugiés.

Comme suite à ces conversations, je me permets de vous adresser ci-après un exposé des grandes lignes du nouveau programme d'aide aux réfugiés et des principales mesures qui paraissent à l'Office de nature à permettre l'exécution du programme.

1. L'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, dans sa Résolution 513 (VI) a approuvé à l'unanimité un nouveau programme visant à permettre aux réfugiés de subvenir à leurs propres besoins dans un délai de trois ans environ, et a engagé instamment les gouvernements à verser des contributions s'élevant à 200 millions de dollars pour l'exécution de ce programme. Des crédits supplémentaires totalisant 50 millions de dollars ont été approuvés pour les secours aux réfugiés, secours qui doivent régulièrement décroître pendant la période d'exécution du nouveau programme.

2. L'une des conditions fondamentales du nouveau programme est que la participation des réfugiés n'affectera en rien leurs droits au rapatriement et à la compensation.

3. Le programme sera mis en oeuvre sous forme de projets qui donneront aux réfugiés les moyens de subvenir à leurs propres besoins en leur fournissant des emplois, une formation professionnelle, des prêts, des logements, en créant des entreprises industrielles et commerciales, et en leur attribuant des terres cultivables. Le Rapport spécial du Directeur et de la Commission consultative de l'Office à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies contient un exposé plus détaillé du programme.

/4. Le programme

Son Excellence
Le Général Fawzi Sélo,
Chef de l'Etat Syrien et
Président du Conseil,
Damas, Syrie.

4. Le programme de 200 millions de dollars a été élaboré en vue d'aider quelque 150.000 familles réfugiées à subvenir à leurs propres besoins. Les contributions seront dépensées dans les pays d'accueil sensiblement au prorata du nombre de familles qui pourront y trouver des moyens d'existence.

La Syrie s'est montré disposée à accueillir environ 125.000 familles au total. Pour la mise en oeuvre des projets destinés à venir en aide à ces réfugiés, l'Office envisage de dépenser en Syrie 170 millions de dollars environ, plus une fraction correspondante des crédits de secours.

5. Le programme une fois approuvé, l'Office s'efforcera constamment, dans son exécution, de rendre aux réfugiés des moyens d'existence de telle manière qu'ils contribuent dans toute la mesure du possible à la prospérité de l'économie syrienne. Dans la mesure où l'accomplissement de son programme le lui permettra, l'Office s'efforcera d'utiliser les experts, le personnel, les services et les produits syriens.

6. En retour, l'Office demande au Gouvernement Syrien de l'aider à tirer le meilleur parti des fonds d'assistance aux réfugiés, en mettant gratuitement à sa disposition des terres domaniales, en fournissant des services dans tous les cas possibles, en réduisant les prix des marchandises importées par une exemption totale de droits de douane et de taxes, et en prenant des mesures de nature à faciliter la tâche de l'Office et de son personnel.

7. L'Office prévoit que le Gouvernement de l'Etat Syrien prendra les mesures nécessaires, tant à l'égard des réfugiés qui choisiront de bénéficier du programme de l'UNRWA en Syrie que vis-à-vis des gouvernements des pays où ils résident actuellement, pour faciliter leur transfert et pour leur permettre de participer sans restriction à ce programme.

Ces sept points sont présentés à Votre Excellence dans l'espoir qu'ils seront approuvés par votre Gouvernement et qu'ils constitueront ainsi le cadre du programme conjoint d'assistance aux réfugiés.

L'Office serait très honoré de recevoir de Votre Excellence une lettre d'approbation et considérerait cet échange de lettres comme établissant un accord de base entre le Gouvernement de l'Etat Syrien et l'Office de Secours et de Travaux des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés de Palestine.

Cet accord de base pourrait alors être appliqué grâce à des annexes qui, sanctionnant périodiquement l'entente entre le Gouvernement Syrien et l'Office sur les

/principales

principales catégories de projets, permettront de mettre en oeuvre le programme.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

John B. Blandford Jr.
Directeur de l'Office de Secours et de Travaux
des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés
de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient

C O N F I D E N T I E L

Le 21 avril 1952.

Excellence,

L'accord de base récemment conclu entre le Gouvernement Syrien et l'Office de Secours et de Travaux des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés de Palestine prévoit une série d'annexes pour la mise en pratique de ses dispositions.

A la suite des conversations entre les représentants du Gouvernement et de l'Office, le Gouvernement de l'Etat Syrien et l'Office de Secours et de Travaux des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés de Palestine se sont mis d'accord sur le contenu et les termes de la première annexe ci-dessous à l'accord de base.

1° - Le Gouvernement donne son consentement et apportera sa coopération à un Programme de trois ans environ visant à permettre à quelque 20.000 familles réfugiées de subvenir à leurs propres besoins; ce programme sera financé sur les contributions fournies à l'Office, pour un montant d'environ 30 millions de dollars.

2° - La répartition des familles réfugiées et des fonds entre les catégories de projets sera à peu près la suivante :

	Familles	Dollars
Education	3.000	5.000.000,--
Prêts à l'industrie et au commerce	1.000	1.000.000,--
Projets sur des terres privées	3.000	4.000.000,--
Projets sur des terres publiques	13.000	20.000.000,--
	20.000	30.000.000,--

3° - Le chiffre de 20.000 familles comprend les familles réfugiées vivant actuellement en Syrie, plus un certain nombre de familles supplémentaires (environ 4.000) qui auront choisi, avec l'approbation du Gouvernement Syrien, de venir en Syrie où elles participeront au programme et pourront ainsi subvenir à leurs propres besoins.

4° - Il est admis que, une fois ces 20.000 familles incorporées dans le nouveau programme, une fraction des trente million de dollars prévus sera consacrée à l'éducation, à la santé et aux services sociaux, avant que soit atteint le stade final de l'indépendance économique.

Son Excellence le Général Fawzi Sélo
Chef de l'Etat Syrien et Président du Conseil
D a m a s

/5° - Des conventions

5° - Des conventions spéciales, passées pour chacun des projets entre des représentants du Gouvernement et de l'Office, permettront de mettre en oeuvre les différentes catégories de projets visés dans la présente Annexe. Chaque convention spéciale comportera une description détaillée du projet, un plan de dépenses et les dispositions nécessaires concernant les travaux de construction ainsi que l'exploitation des installations par les réfugiés.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

John B. Blandford Jr.
Directeur, UNRWA

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/11

Sir H. Knight
Beirut
to Mr Evans.

AC. 100/3.

18.4.52.

26.4.52.

Resettlement - Syria.

Encloses note on the Advisory Commission meeting on 17th April on the proposed for the expenditure of 30 million dollars on reintegration - Syria.

Last Paper

(*Minutes*)

JH 9/5

References

EE 1825/8 + 9

(*Print*)

(*How disposed of*)

(Action completed)	(Index)

Next Paper

(AC 100/3)

SECRET

E 1825/11

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

18th April, 1952.

E

E 1825/9

My dear Evans,

In continuation of my letter (AC 100/3) of the 15th April and my telegram of to-day.

E 1825/8

2. I enclose for information a rough note on our Advisory Commission meeting of last night.

3. I am sending a copy of this to Montagu-Pollock and to Furlonge. As I have no more copies, perhaps you could have a copy sent to Greenhill if you think it necessary.

Yours sincerely,

H.F. Knight

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

NOTE OF DISCUSSION AT ADCOM MEETING 17.4.52

The Director said that he had seen Col Selo on 14th and had discussed the proposal for expenditure of 30 million dollars on refugee reintegration in Syria to cover 20,000 families. Selo had asked that of this a million dollars should be transfer-ed from Settlement on Private Lands to Education, which would make the programme

Education 5.m.

Loans 1.m

Private land 4.m

Governement

Land scheme 20.m.

The greater part of the interview was however spent in Selo explaining that he is now willing to agree, by an exchange of letters with Blandford, to settle 500,000 refugees from Jordan, Gaza and the Lebanon, as well as the existing 80,000 in Syria. He did not propose a formal agreement but an exchange of letters covering an overall agreement, to which from time to time annexes would be attached covering the various projects agreed on, and the first of these would bethat for the 30 million project. Unrwa would propose any guarantees it thought fit and Selo would propose others. He was urgent for quick action as there are elections in prospect in Syria and if he and Blandford signed letters he was sure the following Govenment would honour them. He considered that Syria would be making a considerable sacrifice in such an agreement as there would be many difficulties involved in putting shhemes into force for recieving so many refugees, and he would be very happy if UNRWA could find other funds which could be expended through UNRWA for the general economic development of Syria.

Blandford said this attitude of Selo did not come as a complete surprise as he had heard unofficially that Shishakly had mentioned the possibility of settling 500,000 refugees as permanent residents in Syria. As regrds the "other funds" Blandford assumes that this refers to various forms of Bilateral Aid which Selo would prefer to have spent by UNRWA rather than the by

the countries or institutions providing the money. Selo seemed to assume 200 million dollars as the amount to be expended for general economic development of Syria.

Selo was very anxious for early acceptence of the proposal and the exchange of letters, and equally anxious that there should be no publicity about the matter and that the news should not leak out. The first information would probably be about the educational programme which woud appeal both to refugees and to Syrians. Blandford added that he envisaged that if the proposal went through , UNRWA would participate in a general large scale development of Syria specially relating it to the refuggee problem.

Blandford added that if Selo was serious in his proposal it was a very couragous action by Syria. But that he of course could not say what Selo's real intention is ,but it does form a basis for UNRWA to make the experiment suggested .

The French Member said that it was only with great reluctance that he agreed to primary and secondary education being considered as part of reintegration. In his view setlement on private land was vital. He was doubtful of UNRWA being able to commit the Governments to provide funds for more than one year.

The Turkish Member wanted to know Selo's real intention. Syria like the other N.E. countries wants to profit at UNRWA's expense. Selo will profit from the educational expenditure and will never do any reintegration of refugees. Itis the old technique of the Arab Governments "dragging their feet." UNRWA ought to insist on reintegration first and then education.

The American Member said that there was every chance that the USA would accept the proposal as it was anxious to have reintegration funds committed

The Director said he would put up a draft letter for exchange with Selo on 19.4.52. Selo hadwanted to discuss this on 19th or 20th, but Blandford would go to Damascus on 21st with it

18.4.52.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825 | 12

FROM

Mr Montagu-Pollock
Damascus.
to Mr Ross

No. 18202/43/52.

Dated 28-4-52.

Received in Registry— 6.5.52.

Negotiations with Syria.

Discusses the views of Dr Depage and the U.S. Minister on Syria's motives in agreeing to resettle refugees. Reports on Dr Depage's success in gaining confidence with the Syrians.

Copied) Beirut, Fayid, Cairo, W. Von.

REFERENCES

-/8.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Sir Henry Knight, Beirut from Mr Evans 20 May
8) Sir T. Rapp, Fayid. 21 May
8) Mr Crawford, Dev. Div'n Beirut. 21 May
8) Mr Greenhill W Hon 21 May
8) Mr Montagu-Pollock, Damascus. 21 May

(Action completed) 8) 24/5

(Index) 30/5.

MINUTES

It is a great help that Mr Montagu Pollock is convinced of the wisdom of the UNRWA venture in Syria.

I agree that on balance the UNRWA Director in Syria should be a "neutral" & have consistently expressed this view to Sir H. Knight. The difficulty is, of course, that the French would like a French nominee — they in fact put forward the name of a well known French general, who, in spite of the fact that he was (so I am told) a good man & of considerable French pressure, was turned down by the Syrians. If the French succeed eventually in persuading the Syrians to accept a Frenchman, we should I think be wise to raise no objection. French support for the resettlement plan is

38679

is probably essential.

M. Despagnet has done well but it is doubtful whether he is of the calibre to be Director of Syria, if the resettlement of 500,000 refugees from outside is opened up.

No action by us is, I think required.

M. Wardrop. 8/5

M. Ross (or returned) 8/5

We shd use our influence to secure the appointment of a competent "neutral". A Frenchman is just as objectionable as an Englishman or an American, and we ought to head the French off before they go too far.

A.D.M.K.
10/5

Mr Evans

I submit a draft letter to Sir H Knight.

M. Ross 10/5

Thanks.

A.D.M.K.
21/5.

21/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

E 1825/12

British Legation,

DAMASCUS.

28th April, 1952.

18202/43/52

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Archie, EY 110 (being entered)

With reference to paragraph 8 of my letter to you No. 11601/36/52 of the 28th April, I would first like to say that I am in full agreement with the view expressed in Foreign Office telegram No. 309 to Knight that the present opportunity to settle refugees in Syria should not be missed, despite the risks involved. I have been trying to analyse the motives of Silo and Shishakli. Depage, the UNRWA representative in Syria, thinks that Shishakli has simply decided that now is the time to recoup the benefits in increased population and resources which the settlement of refugees may bring to Syria and has recognized the over-riding need to find some solution to the refugee problem, views which Shishakli has in fact expounded to him. My American colleague, on the other hand, considers that the main Syrian impulse is the need for money which, it is believed, Ibn Saud has refused to produce. At the same time the United States Legation have told the State Department that, in their view, the régime has a real desire to settle the refugees as a contribution towards the strengthening of Syria.

2. It seems not unlikely that all these factors have played their part, together with the fact that Depage has managed to gain the confidence of the Syrian authorities by his patience and unobtrusiveness. He himself ascribes this success partly to his Belgian nationality and I think that we should bear this point in mind if there were a move to replace him by a more experienced administrator, in the event of UNRWA now greatly expanding its work in Syria. During my two years here I have never heard a Syrian utter a word against Depage, which says a lot in his favour.

3. Depage also gives credit to Daoudi, the Head of the Syrian Refugee Organization who, he claims, is in Silo's confidence and with whom Depage can speak his mind freely. They have been co-operating in a mixed Syrian-UNRWA Commission in putting Blandford's proposals into a shape likely to be acceptable to Silo and in generally preparing the ground for their meetings.

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Knight, Rapp, Crawford and Greenhill.

Yours ever,

Bill Bullock

A.D.M.Ross, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
S. W. 1.

(Mr Evans.)

Registry
No. EE 1825/12.

~~Top Secret.~~
~~Secret.~~
Confidential.
~~Restricted.~~
~~Open.~~

Draft.

Sir Henry Knight
K.C.S.I.,
C.I.E.,
British Legation
Beirut.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
20 MAY 1952
SENT TO REGISTRY 20/5

FROM :
Mr Evans.

M. Moss
10/5

COPIES to :-
1. Sir T. Rapp, Fayid.
2. Mr Crawford, Development Div. Beirut.
3. Mr Greenhill, Washington.
4. Mr Montagu-Pollock, Damascus.

Wt. 11647/234 250m 7/51 V.P.Co. 51-8078

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

May, 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Please refer to Montagu-Pollock's letter 18202/43/52 of the 28th April.

2. We agree that Depage's Belgian nationality has probably helped him to gain the confidence of the Syrians and that the value of a "neutral" should be borne in mind in the event of there being a move to replace him.

3. We should be very interested to know whether Blandford still has it in mind to appoint a higher-powered Director in Syria and, if so, whether he is still prepared to give the post to a Frenchman. We assume that if there is any question of a replacement, the French will press very hard for one of their people.

4. As you know, we have always felt that a "neutral" was very definitely indicated for Syria. The question is whether we can use our influence to this end without undue risk of antagonising the French, possibly to the point of their trying to sabotage any agreement between the Agency and the Syrian Government over large-scale resettlement. As we see it, the support of the French, or at least their benevolent neutrality, is essential if agreement

/is to be .....

is to be reached with the Syrians, We should be glad to have your views and those of Montagu-Pollock, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter.

6. Copies of this letter are also being sent to Rapp and Greenhill.

(T. E. Evans.)

and it would therefore seem to be a question of convincing the French that it is not really in their interest that the Director in Syria, who will be the butt of all criticism, should be a Frenchman anymore than that it is in our interest that he should be British. The French might argue that for similar reasons the Director in Jordan should not be British. Though there is some force in the argument, it does not, I think apply so strongly in Jordan as in Syria. Our view as regards Jordan is that the man with the best qualifications should be appointed irrespective of his nationality.

19/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUTFILE

(EE 1825/12)

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

20th May, 1952.

Dear Sir Henry

Please refer to Montagu-Pollock's letter 18202/43/52 of the 28th April.

2. We agree that Depage's Belgian nationality has probably helped him to gain the confidence of the Syrians and that the valueof a "neutral" should be borne in mind in the event of there being a move to replace him.

3. We should be very interested to know whether Blandford still has it in mind to appoint a higher-powered Director in Syria and, if so, whether he is still prepared to give the post to a Frenchman. We assume that if there is any question of a replacement, the French will press very hard for one of their people.

4. As you know, we have always felt that a "neutral" was very definitely indicated for Syria. The question is whether we can use our influence to this end without undue risk of antagonising the French, possibly to the point of their trying to sabotage any agreement between the Agency and the Syrian Government over large-scale resettlement. As we see it, the support of the French, or at least their benevolent neutrality, is essential if agreement is to be reached with the Syrians, and it would therefore seem to be a question of convincing the French that it is not really in their interest that the Director in Syria, who will be the butt of all criticism, should be a Frenchman anymore than that it is in our interest that he should be British. The French might argue that for similar reasons the Director in Jordan should not be British. Though there is some force in the argument, it does not, I think apply so strongly in Jordan as in Syria. Our view as regards Jordan is that the man with the best qualifications should be appointed irrespective of his nationality.

5. We should be glad to have your views and those of Montagu-Pollock, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter.

6. Copies of this letter are also being sent to Rapp and Greenhill.

Yours ever

(T. E. Evans)

Sir Henry Knight, K.C.S.I., C.I.E.,

Beirut.

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/13

FROM

F.O. Minute

(Mr Selwyn Lloyd)

No.

Dated 2.5.52.

Received in Registry— 6.5.52.

Dr Jamali.

Dr Jamali's opinion that a lot of the money spent on refugees was being wasted. His opinion on Gen. Eisenhower's policy.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)	(Index)
8/ 24/5.	30/5

MINUTES

Refugees in small numbers are now going to, & finding work in, Iraq. As the Development Plan gets under way in two or three years, the number of refugees to be attracted may be very considerable. 15/5

Eastern Dept (Mr Price Gordon)

2.5.52.

19 21/5

39984

CONFIDENTIAL

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Dr. Jamali to-day referred to the Arab refugee problem which he said was poisoning the whole atmosphere among the Arab states. A great deal of the money now being spent was being wasted and no one was grateful to those who were contributing. There could be no settlement unless the Jews were willing to yield some Arab territory. We must go back to something like the Bernadotte Plan. He believed that Eisenhower had a much sounder appreciation of the strategic importance of this matter, and he thought that the American view would change if he were to be elected President.

I do not. If I rejoin would take some refugees they would be better qualified to speak

AE May 5

(Sgd.) SELWYN LLOYD

2nd May, 1952.

Seen by R M/S & 10/5.

Copies to:-

Secretary of State
Sir William Strang
~~Mr. A. Nutting~~
~~Lord Reading~~
Sir James Bowker
U.N. (E) Department

6 see S of S's minute

Eastern Dept should see the S/S's comments.

AAD 7/5

7/5

CONFIDENTIAL

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

Dr. Jamali to-day referred to the Arab refugee problem which he said was poisoning the whole atmosphere among the Arab states. A great deal of the money now being spent was being wasted and no one was grateful to those who were contributing. There could be no settlement unless the Jews were willing to yield some Arab territory. We must go back to something like the Bernadotte Plan. He believed that Eisenhower had a much sounder appreciation of the strategic importance of this matter, and he thought that the American view would change if he were to be elected President.

(Sgd.) SELWYN LLOYD

2nd May, 1952.

Copies to:-

Secretary of State
Sir William Strang
Mr. A. Nutting
Lord Reading
Sir James Bowker
U.N. (E) Department

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1825/14

FROM Sir Henry Knight Beirut, to Mr. Evans.

No. AC 100/3A

Dated 6th } May.

Received in Registry— 15th }

Negotiations with Syria.

Encloses copies of proposals by Mr. Blandford, regarding negotiations with Syria, and the Jordan Programme

REFERENCES

EE 1825/11 + ~~10~~.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Col. Russell Edmunds Esq. 26 May.

8) Mr Williams Esq. 26 May.

(Action completed) 19/6

(Index) 14/6

(MINUTES)

The possibility referred to in the last para of Mr. Blandford's paper No. 35 will have to be carefully watched, otherwise H.M.G. may be left with financial responsibility for refugees in Jordan after the UNRWA programme has been completed.

Annex B should be noted. A good deal of work on the West Bank is envisaged.

We have already received the drafts attached to Paper No 36.

Copies of Paper No 35 (with the annexes should go to the Treasury (Col Russell Edmunds & Mr. O.L. Williams).

M. Hunter c.c.

18/1

37799

(Beit

Beit Sala is also on the West Bank (closer to Bethlehem), which means that 300 of 420 families in the Urban Housing section will be on that side of Jordan. The Nashashibi fruit rearing project is presumably on that side too.

The Jordanians may welcome the opportunity of rearing a "baby" for someone else to carry when UNRWA goes.

J. M. Hunter
CBE.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE.

United Kingdom Delegation
Advisory Commission UNRWA
BEIRUT

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

(AC 100/3A)

SECRET

6th May, 1952.

EE1825/14

My dear Evans,

I enclose copies of proposals by Blandford for the Advisory Commission regarding negotiations with Syria and the Jordan Programme.

2. The Advisory Commission has not yet had the opportunity to discuss these, which were only received last night.

Yours sincerely,

(H.F. KNIGHT)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

Ad. C. 228

AC100/3A

Eng. Copy No. 11

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 36

5 May 1952

Subject: Negotiations with Syria

At our last meeting I reported orally the result of my last conference with the Government of Syria and promised to transmit to the Advisory Commission the drafts of the two letters which formed the basis of our conference. I also suggested that I would send tentative drafts of additional paragraphs to be inserted in the first letter of basic agreement for discussion at the next meeting with the Syrian Government.

Letters Transmitted to the Syrian Government

The history of these letters is briefly as follows. I brought to the Advisory Commission a document which I am designating as the first draft of the basic agreement. After consultation with the Advisory Commission, a second draft was prepared and sent to our Country Representative. At the same time I prepared a draft of an annex with respect to $ 30 million of projects by categories and cleared it informally with the Advisory Commission. Copies of these documents have been sent to the Commission. After consultation with a representative of the Syrian Government, a few changes were made in these two draft letters. I am now attaching the revised drafts as they finally were forwarded to the Chief of State.

In the letter on the basic agreement, the changes are solely in numbered paragraphs 6 and 7. I can orally explain the relatively unimportant purpose of these changes. With respect to the letter constituting the first annex, there was a small change in Paragraph No. 1 by substituting "ending about June 30, 1954" for "approximately three years". Secondly, the additional services item was broken out of the $ 5,000,000 total for education, and old Paragraph No. 4 was eliminated by way of simplification.

Further Suggestions

At our last meeting I informed the Advisory Commission that the Government of Syria was seeking assurances as to the continuity of the Agency's operations and as to interest and helpfulness, if possible, on the parallel program of economic development for its nationals. I have made an initial effort to suggest some additions to our letter on the basic agreement which might, in a measure, meet the desires of the Syrian Government.

/For purposes

760.

For purposes of discussion I am proposing that our letter be re-written after Point (7) as follows:

"These seven points are presented, Your Excellency, with the hope that they may meet with the approval of your Government and with the willingness that they form the firm framework of a cooperative programme of assistance to the refugees.

"With such an understanding, the Agency could then take the necessary steps to plan its organization and its financing for a sustained effort over the period of time required to make the refugee families self-supporting, subject, of course, to the continuing approval of the Government and periodic review by the United Nations.

"The Agency also expresses the hope that the large programme expenditures, principally, to help refugee families become economic assets of the Syrian economy will be paralleled by equally substantial economic investment for the general advancement of the economy of Syria and its citizens. The Agency is prepared, at the request of the Government of Syria, im any appropriate manner within its frame of reference and within its resources, to encourage and facilitate such plans for general economic development.

"The Agency would be honoured to receive a letter of approval from Your Excellency and would consider the exchange of letters as constituting a basic agreement between the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

"Such a basic agreement can then be implemented by annexes which, from time to time, will record agreement on main categories of projects and actually launch the programme.

"With the expression of my highest esteem ....."

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB:ep

Third Draft

21 April, 1952

Excellency,

May I convey to Your Excellency my great appreciation for the opportunities you have granted recently for discussion of the problem of the Palestine refugees and for consideration of arrangements whereby the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency might cooperate to improve refugee living conditions.

Pursuant to these conversations, I am setting forth below the principal facts of the new programme of refugee assistance and the principal arrangements which it is believed would facilitate the execution of the programme:

(1) The United Nations Assembly Resolution 513 (VI) unanimously approved a new Programme designed to assist refugees to become self-supporting within a period of approximately three years and urged Governments to contribute $200 million for this programme. Additional contributions of $50 million were approved for refugee relief on a declining basis over the same period.

(2) A basic premise of this new programme, is that refugee participation in the programme shall in no way prejudice refugee interests in repatriation and compensation.

(3) The programme is to be implemented by projects which will provide self-support for refugees by means of employment, training, loans, housing, industrial and commercial enterprises, and development and cultivation of lands. A detailed outline of the programme is presented in the 1951 special report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the Agency to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(4) The two hundred million dollar programme is intended to help some 150,000 refugee families to become self-supporting. The contributed funds will be expended in countries approximately in proportion to the number of families which are assured opportunities for self-support.

Syria has indicated a willingness to receive a total of approximately 125,000 families. For projects to accomodate this number of families, the Agency envisages expenditures in Syria of approximately $170 million plus an appropriate part of the funds available for relief.

(5) In the implementation of an approved programme it will be the constant effort of the Agency to provide self-support for refugees in a manner which will be of maximum benefit to the economy of Syria. Consistent with the programme purpose, the Agency will make maximum effort to utilise experts and general employees, products and services from the Syrian economy.

/(6) In turn

His Excellency General Fawzi Selo,
Head of the State and Prime Minister,
Syrian Republic,
Damascus.

(6) In turn, the Agency requests that the Government of Syria maximize the benefits to refugees by making grants of public lands, in connection with Governmental projects and otherwise as feasible, by reducing the cost of imported commodities through waiving of duties and taxes, and generally by services and arrangements which will facilitate the operation of the Agency and its personnel.

(7) Further, the Agency assumes that the Government of Syria will make appropriate arrangements to facilitate the transfer of the refugees who may choose to enjoy the benefits of the programme in Syria and to allow their full participation in that programme.

These seven points are presented, Your Excellency, with the hope that they may meet with the approval of Your Government and with the willingness that they form the firm framework of a cooperative programme of assistance to the refugees.

The Agency would be honoured to receive a letter of approval from Your Excellency and would consider the exchange of letters as constituting a basic agreement between the Goverment of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

Such a basic agreement can then be implemented by annexes which, from time to time, will record agreement on main categories of projects and actually launch the programme.

With the expression of my highest esteem,

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency,

Yours very truly,

John B. Blandford,
Director, UNRWA

Third Draft

VERY CONFIDENTIAL

21 April, 1952

Excellency,

The basic agreement recently concluded between the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency proposed a series of annexes as the method of implementing the agreement.

As a result of conferences between representatives of the Government and of the Agency, the Government of Syria and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency are now in agreement on the content and conditions of the first annex to the basic agreement as follows:

1. The Government approves and will cooperate in carrying out a program, ending about June 30th, 1954, to provide self-support for approximately 20,000 refugee families, to be financed out of funds contributed to the Agency in an amount of approximately $30 million.

2. The distribution of funds shall be approximately as indicated below in terms of program categories and number of families benefited:

	Families	Dollars
Technical Training project	3,000	3,000,000
Industrial & Commercial Projects	1,000	1,000,000
Private land Projects	3,000	4,000,000
Public Land Projects	13,000	20,000,000
Services (principally Education)		2,000,000
TOTAL		$30,000,000

3. The figure of 20,000 families is intended to include the number of refugee families now in Syria and an additional number - approximately 4,000 families - which may choose, with the approval of the Government of Syria, to come to Syria to become self-supporting through participation in the program.

4. The various categories of this program annex are to be implemented by specific project agreements entered into between representatives of the Government and of the Agency. A project agreement

/will

His Excellency,
General Fawzi Selo,
Head of the State & Prime Minister
Syrian Republic,
Damascus.

will describe in detail the scope of the project, the plan of expenditure, and the arrangements for construction, operation and utilisation by the refugees.

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency,

With expressions of my highest regard,

Yours very truly,

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

Ad. P. 227

AC218

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPOSAL FOR ADVISORY COMMISSION CONSIDERATION

No. 35

EE 1825/14.

3 May 1952

Subject: The Jordan Program

Recent conferences in Amman have pointed up the Jordan program and suggested arrangements for expediting its execution. There have been conferences among the staff which have outlined new procedures and administrative adjustments. There have been conferences with the Government which have sketched out the first stages of the new program of self-support and considered new methods of cooperation between the Agency and the Government.

To facilitate these discussions, a second edition of Jordan program notes was prepared and is attached to this proposal as Annex A. Some of the points contained in this annex will be discussed further below, and the Director would appreciate Advisory Commission comment. Perhaps more important and more immediate is the desirability of an exchange of letters between the Agency and the Jordan Government with respect to a program of new projects for refugee self-support.

The First Program Agreement

The principal result of the conferences with the Government was a tentative agreement that the following program go forward.

		US Dollars
Category I	Research, Experimentation and Planning	500,000
Category II	Agriculture	7,750,000
Category III	Industry, Commercial and Banking	1,250,000
Category IV	Urban Housing	500,000
Category V	Training	1,000,000
	Total	11,000,000

Attached to this proposal is Annex B which suggests kinds of projects which may be undertaken under the broad categories. A few of the projects are either under way or have been sufficiently studied to give an assurance of their feasibility. Generally speaking, most of the suggested projects require further investigation and, in some cases, may be replaced by alternative

/schemes

259

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schemes of the same general character. The agreement between the Government and the Director would relate to the principal categories. Projects of the types indicated in Annex B would develop from time to time at the country level.

Also attached is Annex C, which offers a tentative breakdown of Category V -- Training. Here too we have but general indication of intent; the actual projects must be worked out between the Agency and the Ministry of Education of the Jordan Government. A representative of the Headquarters Education Division will, of course, be the principal adviser to the Country Representative as these educational projects unfold.

There are other details of this program which can be offered orally in a meeting with the Advisory Commission. Perhaps two more points should be made here. One is that the Yarmuk project referred to in Annex B is not intended to include the main channel or the laterals. Rather, it is intended to provide housing and community facilities for the refugee portion of the beneficiaries of the project. With respect to private land schemes, the Country Representative is now attempting to work out with the Government a standard agreement for such undertakings, with special consideration being given to the interests of the refugee tenants or refugee landowners.

Implementation

After the exchange of letters which will indicate agreement between the Agency and the Government on the categories of projects, it is proposed that the program be implemented by project agreements entered into from time to time by the Country Representative and a representative of the Government. The projects will be of the types indicated in the annexed justification and will conform to general standards approved by the Director after consultation with the Advisory Commission. Special arrangements will be made for referring to Headquarters occasional projects which have some special significance. An example of this type of project would be the Yarmuk with its potential of developing along various lines and under various forms of cooperation. As project agreements are executed, copies will immediately come to Headquarters for commitment of necessary funds and for inclusion in our regular reporting system. In no manner can this filing with Headquarters cause any delay in prompt execution of the project.

In carrying out the projects it is hoped to utilize the resources of private enterprise through a system of loans wherever possible. Projects handled in this manner will include importantly the development of private lands and small industrial undertakings. For projects which involve the use of public lands, it is hoped to create a public corporation which can not only prosecute the projects but can also take custody of them upon completion. Pending the creation of some such instrumentality, it is contemplated that momentum may be maintained through

/Agency

Agency responsibility for the projects. Finally, it is proposed that there be a system of grants to refugees which will facilitate their participation in the new projects or embarking on enterprises of their own.

The Development Bank

Mention has been made of the importance of this institution as one instrument for carrying on the new program. Of course the Bank now exists. Our discussions have turned rather on ways and means of making it more useful and active. Generally the Government and the Agency are in agreement as to the necessary steps. First, it is proposed to give a bit more flexibility to its operations by applying the rule that refugees shall benefit in proportion to Agency financial participation on the basis of a period of time -- perhaps six months -- rather than on an individual project basis. Secondly, it is proposed that the present practise of requiring traditional mortgage security for loans be modified to include properly investigated character loans to refugee applicants. Thirdly, in support of these measures and for other reasons, it is planned to equip the Bank with a small staff of experts which might include representation from Government Ministries. The general objective of this last measure is to stimulate good project loans, assist in their preparation and be helpful in their supervision. The Agency is planning to send a note to the Government with reference to these points and later participate more formally in obtaining their acceptance by the Directors of the Bank.

The Grant System

The Agency has long had in mind the necessity of providing a refugee with tools, animals and seeds in connection with his participation in a public project or even possibly a private one. We have always assumed we would have to pay for transportation to a point of employment and we have considered occasional training projects in the framework of grants. Always we have speculated as to the possibility of some form of grant which might encourage a refugee to seek his own manner of self-support. All through this thinking there has been concern as to the uniformity or equity of arrangements. We now wish to attempt to rationalize and systematize a scheme of grants which would be available to any refugee family who was willing to leave the ration rolls.

In short, under the new arrangement a refugee family might receive, in the form of a grant either in cash or kind, transportation to a job, training to prepare him for a job, cash or kind to enable him to take advantage of an opportunity for self-support, cash or kind which might be supplemented by a loan from the Development Bank or just cash and kind to enable him to go off on a venture of his own. The precise procedure and the size of the grant are now matters of study in Jordan.

Internal Arrangements

For some time we have been considering the possibility of improvement in the organizational arrangements

/of our

of our country offices. Thought has turned first to Jordan because the program is in a measure now operative. Traditionally our country offices break down into the main divisions of relief and reintegration. Increasingly we have questioned the wisdom of this pattern. There are two important deficiencies. On the one hand, a large sector of local staff is identified with a more or less negative and declining Agency operation in a manner which is clearly not conducive to sustained morale. This old program of relief, after long association with it, loses a bit of its glamor as a fine humanitarian undertaking. The operations can hardly be called constructive. The funds available promise rapidly to decline. On the other side there is this new program of reintegration with its personnel now optimistically facing forward with much constructive opportunity ahead and promise of adequate financial support. It is our present feeling that our entire country office personnel should in some way be lifted out of the demoralizing impacts of the old program and become participants in the stimulating environment of the new program.

With these objectives in mind we are now considering having one branch of our local office freshly launched in a program of service and rehabilitation of individual refugee families. This branch would follow the refugee from the tattered tent to the new home and the new employment. It would look upon the current camps and services as but staging operations for more constructive days ahead. The branch would not only be responsible for current relief operations but would also have at hand the helpful new tools of training, grants and placement.

The second branch would not concern itself with the individual refugee family or the new services for them but rather with the creation of physical facilities which the refugee family could use in order to become self-supporting. This branch would promote, through the Bank and through the public corporation, agricultural and industrial projects properly integrated into the general economic development of the country in which it was working. We are inclined to feel that this new mobilization of effort would not only spread the stimulus of the new program broadly through the staff, but would also make possible a better concentration of expertness on two distinctly different functions. The precise plans for working along these lines are now under consideration.

Next Program Steps

The $ 11,000,000 program outlined above is hoped to provide self-support for approximately 5,000 families in Jordan. After perhaps a year of patient probing of the Jordan economy, there seems to be reasonable assurance that projects can be found to accommodate this number of families. Once the program agreement is signed and the projects beging to flow, we must early turn attention to new program opportunities in Jordan. I think there is general agreement that the absorptive capacity is limited and that we cannot now see clearly large categories of new projects. However, a determined search must be made . The constant premise of cooperation with other Arab states is that a maximum number of

/refugees

refugees shall be provided with self-support in Jordan. I think that, at least for the present, we should strain for a total of 20,000 families.

Against the possibility that our program may not achieve this total along its traditional lines of providing self-support in projects completed during the three-year period, I recommend we begin to consider alternatives. One possibility is that the Agency might use its new funds as contributions to long-term projects with the understanding that the refugee during our program period would be self-supporting through employment on the project and that other funds would pick him up after the Agency's operations had terminated. More specifically, the Agency might help finance the first two or three years of a large public works or extensive land improvement project or a tree-planting project with the understanding that other funds would continue the employment of the refugees during the development period and ultimately permit participation of the refugee families in the benefits of the completed projects. I think this possibility should be promptly examined. It may well be that the Agency will find it necessary to make some such decision at an early date with respect to the program in Jordan.

John B. Blandford, Jr.

John B. Blandford, Jr.
Director

JBB:ep

PROGRAM NOTES

II

1. The general objective of the new program is to use $ 200 million of contributed funds to produce a maximum improvement in refugee living conditions, a maximum amount of self support, and a maximum reduction in relief expenditures.

2. Emphasis should be placed on projects which achieve these objectives at the lowest cost per family. Consideration should be given to normal and typical costs for similar undertakings in the country. There should be reasonable equity among refugee families and as between refugee new-national families and the families of nationals living under similar conditions.

3. From time to time the Agency and the Government will agree on programs subdivided into general categories of undertakings. These program agreements or exchange of letters will be signed by a Representative of the Government and the Director of UNRWA.

4. Within the program agreement, projects will be prepared and approved jointly by a Representative of the Government and the Country Representative of the UNRWA. Then the project is ready to start.

5. It is proposed that an effort be made to enlist the co-operation of private enterprise. For this purpose it is suggested that loans be made to individuals, corporations or cooperatives under suitable conditions, for projects which give assurance of repayment of the loan and of making refugees continuously self-supporting without adversely affecting present tenants or employees. The projects may include commercial or industrial undertakings and the improvement of private lands.

6. It is proposed that these loans be made through a Development Bank. Funds for these projects to make refugees self-supporting would be contributed by the Agency to the Bank. The Bank would also receive other funds for loans for general economic development. Practical arrangements would be made for coordinating the loans to achieve both purposes. With respect to projects sponsored by refugees special arrangements may be made with respect to security terms. The Bank should have special technical staff to promote projects and assist borrowers in carrying out projects. Repayments of loans shall be invested in new projects for refugee self-support and general economic development.

7. It is proposed that there be a public corporation or instrumentality especially to carry out projects on public lands. The Corporation would construct villages or land improvements on public lands or on lands acquired from private owners. The Corporation would retain custody of such projects and the revenues therefrom until the projects or part of the project are turned over to project authorities, cooperatives or individuals under suitable terms and conditions. The Agency would make grants to the Corporation in accordance with project agreements in the Government. The Government, wherever possible would contribute public lands and services.

8. The Agency is considering a plan whereby a small grant would be made in cash or kind after investigation to a refugee family which is willing to go off the ration list after an appropriate period and embark on a personal or private enterprise or public scheme which will make him self-supporting. This might include transportation to a place of employment, a vocational training course, a cash advance or tool which would establish him

...2

in business or make him eligible for a loan, or cash or kind which would help him become a tenant or an occupant of a private or public agricultural project.

9. It is hoped that this combination of small individual grant, private loans from the Development Bank and the operations of the public corporation on public lands will be able to handle most of the projects under the new program of self-support. The Agency plans to have experts to provide technical assistance to stimulate projects and to supplement the experts of the Development Bank and the Public Corporation.

Annex B

JORDAN REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME

PROJECT	Families	Total Capital Cost $	Total Recurrent Cost $	Total Cost $
I. Research, Experimentation & Planning				500,000
II. Agriculture				
Private land (Including Kerak)	2,123	6,079,024	277,725	6,356,749
Huweisha	12	11,189	-	11,189
Yarmuk	750	1,071,000	220,500	1,291,500
Beit Qad (To complete housing)	13	11,284	3,822	15,106
Total Families	2,898			
III. Industry, Commercial & Banking				
Fruit & Canning - Nashashibi	15	44,646	6,804	51,450
Brewery	17	47,600	7,711	55,311
Sesame Oil & Products - Barakat	16	60,121	7,257	67,378
Printing - Khouri	6	18,984	2,721	21,705
Printing - Manna'a	13	30,503	5,897	36,400
Printing Offset - Habash	25	59,500	11,340	70,840
Marble Plant - M.R. Ltd.	50	172,200	22,680	194,880
Caramic Products - Mufti	60	117,096	27,216	144,312
Shoe Factory - W. Bank	8	17,472	3,629	21,101
Wire Drawing - P.M.M. & Co.	20	54,880	9,072	63,952
Iron & Brass Foundry - Nebi	83	165,236	37,649	202,885
Plating Workshop - Wafa	10	19,740	4,536	24,276
Car Gaskets - Rapais	8	16,083	3,629	19,712
Radio Workshop - Nammari	3	5,854	1,360	7,214
Caustic Soda	130	311,584	58,971	370,555
Total Families	464			
IV. Urban Housing				
Jericho	50	74,200	-	74,200
Ramallah	50	74,200	-	74,200
Jerusalem	100	148,400	-	148,400
Bethlehem	50	74,200	-	74,200
Aqaba	20	22,176	-	22,176
Amman	50	74,200	-	74,200
Bireh	50	74,200	-	74,200
Beit Jala	50	74,200	-	74,200
Total Families	420			
V. Training Total Families	1,200			1,000,000
GRAND TOTAL	4,982			

Annex C

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED TRAINING PROGRAM IN JORDAN TO JUNE 1954

1. Training of 400 teachers in Government and special training centres.	$	300,000
2. Trade training of carpenters, shoe-makers, weavers, etc. in UNRWA centres for boys.)		
3. Operations of Womens Arts and Crafts centres by UNRWA)	$	200,000
4. Commercial training courses for 300 young men and women	$	125,000
5. Automobile repair courses	$	40,000
6. Course in Agriculture schools	$	35,000
7. Specialised training at Institutions outside the Jordan for selected men and women.	$	200,000
8. Medical and Health training	$	100,000
	$	1,000,000

1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/15.

FROM

Sir H. Knight.

Beirut.

To Mr Evans.

No. AC. 218.

Dated

Received in Registry— 19.5.52. 29.5.52.

(Loans for the Development of land.)

UNRWA Jordan programme

Transmits copy of a letter from Mr Blandford to the Prime Minister of Jordan constituting a first programme agreement between the Govt of Jordan & UNRWA.

Last Paper

References

ET 1102/2.

EE 1826/1

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8) Russell Edmunds. Tsy. 12 June

(Minutes)

We have already had information about this programme from Sir H. Knight.

Copy to Col. Russell-Edmunds, Treasury.

PW 9/6.

(Action completed)	(Index)
12/6	14/6

Next Paper

36390

AA.C.232

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST

Ref: R/CON(19)

AMMAN

12 May, 1952.

Excellency,

1. In fulfilment of your wishes there have been extended conversations between your designated Ministers and representatives of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency with respect to the new program of assistance to refugees and to the implementation of this program.

2. Principally, the conferees have agreed upon a general outline of the first stage of a program of projects and the principal features of the arrangements for carrying out the projects. At the suggestion of Your Ministers I have the honor to offer in this letter a summary which if approved by Your Excellency will constitute a first program agreement between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency:-

i. The new program, unanimously approved by the United Nations Assembly in Resolution 513 VI, is intended over a period of approximately three years to assist refugees to become self-supporting and removed from ration rolls. A basic premise of this new program is that r efugee participation in the program shallin no way prejudice refugee interests in repatriation and compensation.

ii. The Resolution further provides that the program is to be implemented by projects which will provide self-support for refugees by means of employment, training, loans, housing, industrial and commercial enterprises, and development and cultivation of lands. An outline of the program is presented in the 1951 special report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the Agency to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

iii. It is now proposed that there be for Jordan an initial program commitment for projects to be undertaken in accordance with the following categories and estimates of expenditures with the objective of making approximately 5000 refugee families self-supporting and removed from ration rolls.

2/..

Category I	Research, Planning and Surveys	$ 500,000
Category II	Agriculture	$ 7,750,000
Category III	Industrial and Commercial	$ 1,250,000
Category IV	Urban Housing	$ 500,000
Category V	Vocational Training	$ 1,000,000
		$11,000,000

iv. In general, the projects would be similar in type to those tentatively reviewed by the conferees and would be implemented along lines discussed in program notes presented by the Agency. Specifically, the program categories would be carried out through project agreements approved by a representative of the Government and the Country Representative of the Agency.

v. Further, it was considered desirable that projects be executed through a governmental instrumentality for projects involving public lands and buildings and through the Development Bank for projects involving loans to private enterprise for the development of private lands and for industrial and commercial undertakings. Appropriate allocations of Agency funds will be made for these projects as well as for a system of small grants to refugee families under suitable conditions.

With expressions of my highest esteem,

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency,

Yours sincerely,

J.B. Blandford, Jr.
DIRECTOR - UNRWA

His Excellency
The Prime Minister
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/17

FROM

Mr. T. Rapp.
B.M.E.O. Fayid.
to Mr Evans.

No. 182/38/1

Dated

Received in Registry— 28. 5. 52. 4. 6. 52.

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 19/6

(Index) E 18/7

Negotiations with Syria.

Encloses a record of conversations with Mr Blandford & Mr Keen when they gave their views on the Syria proposals.

MINUTES

This adds another slant to the general picture about economic aid to Syria given on EY pp.

E Watkins 10/6

E Dept PWP. 11/6

E R Dept (Mr Ramsbotham) P.R 13/6

18/6

41070

Enter

E

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE,
~~XX SHARIA XOLUMBAT~~
~~XCAIRO~~
Political Division,
G.H.Q., M.E.L.F. 17.

CONFIDENTIAL

(182/38/1)

28th May, 1952.

E E1825/17

Dear Trefor,

During my visit to the Levant last week I had conversations with Blandford and Keen at Beirut. I enclose a record of both conversations herewith.

2. I am sending copies of this letter to Montagu-Pollock, Furlonge and Knight, and to Burrows at Washington.

Yours ever,

[signature]

(T.C. Rapp)

Trefor Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Middle East Secretariat,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

/Enclosure to BMEO Political Division letter No. 182/38/1 of the 28th May, 1952/

Mr. Blandford gave me a brief account of his negotiations with President Silo. He said that this time the initiative lay definitely with the Syrians who themselves proposed the settlement of 150,000 families. In the course of talks, Silo made it clear that politically refugee re-settlement had to be bound up with the general capital development of the country. He therefore put two definite questions :

(a) What is the capital development element in $170 million which UNRWA hope to make available for re-settlement projects in Syria; and

(b) Where is the balance coming from to make up the $200 million which the Syrians consider they need for capital development projects?

2. Mr. Blandford said that the Syrians were prepared to admit after discussion that the capital development element of the $170 million was in the neighbourhood of $60 to $70 million. He hopes to be able to persuade Silo, however, that the capital development element is in fact nearer $100 million. In addition $40 million will be spent on houses and $30 million on seed, etc. He contends that the $40 million is an addition to the wealth of Syria, as the houses will become state property to be paid for by instalments by the refugees. This amount should also, therefore, enter into the account.

3. Out of the $170 million to be spent, $50 million approximately will be for local expenditure and the foreign exchange resources of Syria will be immediately improved to this extent apart from the permanent improvement which will result from the development of land and the increase in the exportable surplus. One result of this will be that Syria's credit worthiness will improve and the International Bank will be prepared to make greater advances than would otherwise have been the case. As regards advances by the International Bank, Mr. Blandford thought that it would eventually be prepared to lend up to $50 million.

4. Mr. Blandford is seeing Silo again this week and hopes to make progress. He brushed aside my suggestions that there were certain political disadvantages where Syria was concerned in accepting to re-settle the refugees contending that these were much outweighed by the advantages. With this I agree although it is clear that the acceptance of Syria of such a re-settlement scheme will raise both internal political problems as well as those with other Arab countries.

5. Mr. Keen did not exude the same optimism and pointed out to me that the difficulties are not only with Syria but on the side of UNRWA. The $170 million mentioned for Syrian re-settlement simply does not exist and the Syrians know it. Of the $250 million required by the UNRWA resolution only $195 have so far been promised, the only contributors being the United States, the United Kingdom and France. France, however, is now proposing to reduce her contribution by 50% and that can only be spent in Metropolitan France. There is no sign of any money from other quarters and he thought it unlikely that the United States would undertake to contribute anything beyond the 70% of the total on which they at present take their stand. Mr. Keen, moreover, pointed out that any realistic estimates of the relief element in the total would obviously exceed the sums mentioned for 1953-1954 possibly by as much as $15 million. That meant that on the present showing there is at least a deficiency of $70 million.

6. I spoke to Mr. Keen about the desperate state of the economic refugees and he gave me as his opinion that UNRWA would eventually have to do something. He also mentioned in this connexion that Mr. Blandford's mind is now moving in the direction of the adoption

/of

of Scheme B, which is a seven to eight years plan aimed at providing work immediately and support eventually. Apparently UNRWA have some disinclination to finance the planting of olive trees in view of the diminishing demand for olive oil in the world markets, but evidently the amount of olives in substance of agriculture had been overlooked.

7. Among other matters Mr. Keen referred to the administrative chaos existing in UNRWA.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

GERMANY: SUPPLIES

E E 1825 | 18

FROM

Mr Myers, Beirut.

to Mr Evans.

No. AC. 100.

Dated 29. 5. 52.

Received in Registry— 9. 6. 52.

Negotiations with Syrian Govt.

Gives a detailed account of Mr Blandford's latest interview with Selo, on development in Syria.

Copied) Fayid, Damascus, Amman.

Last Paper

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

S R-Edmunds, Tsy, 25 June

(Minutes.)

Seen by Sir H Knight.

When M. Blandford comes here next week, we should put it to him that the Syrians should be urged to accept refugees from outside Syria for vocational training. This might be a useful bridge between resettlement of refugees from the outside & the present policy of doing nothing for them in Syria.

Copy to Lee Russell Edmunds (Tsy).

18/6

Eastern Dept (c.a.)

27/6.

CW 30/6

(Action completed) 1/7

(Index) 18/7

Next Paper

34839

(AC 100)

SECRET

E 1825/18

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

29th May, 1952.

Dear Evans,

Sir Henry suggested you might like to have early news of Blandford's report on his latest interview with Selo which he reported to Adcom. this morning. Here it is. I am giving it in extenso because I doubt whether we shall have anything else from Selo before Blandford leaves to visit the States, and I hope that this will enable you to judge for yourself the state of negotiations.

2. Blandford started by informing Selo that as he was touring the area in the next few days and afterwards going Westwards for consultation, he would like to summarize the points on which they agreed. He referred to the various documents he had submitted and pointed out that the plan had the full approval of the Arab States and of the U.N. Assembly. Out of the $170 million to be spent in Syria to settle 125,000 families, as much as $100 million could be shown to be directed to the Syrian programme of economic development. In addition to these projects Syria would be getting the manpower she badly needs. The work would result in further economic improvement and in foreign exchange accumulations as a result of which, among other things, her credit would improve with the International Development Bank. Further, Selo's need for funds was spread over 4 or 5 years and he should consider that there was that time in which to obtain the full amount. One of Syria's principal hopes for aid (the U.S.A.) was particularly interested in seeing the refugees settled as they paid 60 to 70% of the cost of keeping them.

3. Selo replied that he had always spoken frankly like a soldier to Blandford and had never tried to bargain, exposing the inmost secrets of Syria's economic position, hopes and difficulties. He could not feel confident of completing his plans with less than £S800 million or $200 million. He had talked to the British and French Ministers and both had agreed with him that for the refugees to be successfully settled there must be a parallel programme of economic development. He could only see aid coming drop by drop; $4 million for the fiscal year 1951/52, $8 million for that of 1952/53, and $12 million was far from the additional $200 million which he needed. Syria could borrow some, it is true, but would have to pay this back plus 5% interest. He considered that his country deserved better treatment and hoped that at a high level the two subjects of refugees and of economic development of Syria would be treated together. (Blandford was not sure whether he meant here the Western Powers generally or the U.S.A.)

4. Blandford replied that it was clear that they were now close together, and Syria was close to its economic goal. While our job was to make refugees self-supporting we would strive to relate it to Syrian development. It was paradoxical that Syria's generous political plunge would be of value to her. The refugee programme was not parallel as it was bringing both manpower and money to projects which would be part of the economic development of the country. He estimated the benefit as $100 million and if he were right this was already half-way towards the General's programme. The General believed he could get $25 million from the International Development Bank and this figure could be doubled as a result of exchange flow over a period of time. This left $50 million short, to be covered

/over

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

over 4 years from bilateral resources, in fact Mr. Blandford would be prepared to underwrite the small remainder personally. As this was a personal frank discussion, he appealed to Selo to let UNRWA see Selo's specific projects so that the Agency could judge how to relate them to the Agency's programme and how the latter could be best directed to help in Syria's development.

5. Selo agreed to this and instructed his Finance Minister Trabulsi to do so. He then said that he had a specific suggestion to make, that is that UNRWA should immediately "frame" a programme to improve the living conditions of the refugees now living in camps in Syria. For internal purposes this would be labelled a simple programme of improving the living conditions of refugees; we should not even talk about "self-support", but it would inevitably mean that. For external purposes we could tell the U.N. that the conversations with Syria had been successful, that she would begin right away and that the programme would be within the $170 million. The method to be used for improving living conditions was housing on State land and Dr. Daoudi was to arrange at once with Depage - they are meeting to-day.

6. We can assume that Selo means to start a programme on State lands and of vocational training. There should be none on private lands. We must be careful not to use "provocative" words such as "self-support". Selo insisted on this and wanted us to start this programme right away and to study the overall programme. Blandford then asked him if it was correct to say that he had two objectives; (i) Syrian Economic Development, and (ii) Acceptance of 125,000 refugee families "irrespective of the figures that developed". He further pressed Selo to accept $100 million if we could indicate projects that were part of his general goal. Selo said that "he would have to accept, though he was sceptical that it would help him much"; he could agree that $50 million could be counted towards his programme but not more. He would like to see the figures and Mr. Blandford's suggestions about the $100 million. In any case his grand plan was being reduced from $370 to $270 million. Blandford pointed out that this hardly mattered if he achieved his objectives.

7. Blandford gave it as his firm opinion that Selo was friendly and sincere. He had finally agreed to "let the programme start "without having a final solution and hopes we will explore his future plans. Terminology was important and the staff must learn to drop all reference to self-support which has become associated with resettlement. He considered that Selo was perfectly sincere and that this was not a shrewd manoeuvre. We must now await Depage's report and the list of projects to see if we can finance them.

8. MR. LOCKE - asked what use could be made of this news in Congress during the two current critical weeks.

9. BLANDFORD said he hoped that the matter might be referred to in "executive" (I gather "secret") session and that it could be said that Syria had agreed to a programme of improving the living conditions of refugees and that we "identify" this as a first step in the programme of self-support for the refugees.

10. LOCKE pointed out that Selo was out of date with his figures; he had lost the $4 million for technical assistance in this fiscal year and the sum for next year had not yet been voted; further, when it was available it would be for Technical Assistance and would cover only the necessary surveys before the projects were started. When

/they

they began they should be financed

(i) by UNRWA, as far as this was compatible with their programme;

(ii) by the International Development Bank;

(iii) by a big effort by the Syrians themselves, and then

(iv) if there genuinely remained a gap, and if the Syrians were really starting on a programme to get the refugees settled, he would willingly discuss with Selo the possibility of a loan from the U.S. He could not promise that it would be given but he could say that if it were required under such circumstances, the request would be seriously considered.

11. MYERS asked if the State lands for housing were to be situated on good agricultural lands, and BLANDFORD said that he assumed that they were to be.

12. RADIUS asked whether this exclusion of private lands was from a deep-rooted principle or only a temporary expedient, as we knew that settlement on private lands would be cheaper and quicker than on State. BLANDFORD replied that he thought the objection might be overcome later, as the programme flowed along, but that he did not wish to raise it now as he knew that Selo had no love for the big landlords.

13. RADIUS asked since Selo was ready to start the programme now, did this mean that there was to be no exchange of letters on the general programme. BLANDFORD replied that it was not now possible to sign letters as a global agreement had not been worked out, that he did not think letters or documents important, but attached more importance to oral promises; that letters may be liabilities as Governments look at all the commas and details and hold them up; that we could get the letter later or sign agreements on projects. The Government commits itself by acts more than words.

14. JORDAN

In speaking of Jordan, Blandford said that there had been no reply to UNRWA's letter to the Prime Minister on the programme, but there was no need to be impatient about this. They had heard from the Ministry of National Economy that they were delighted at UNRWA's more liberal interpretation of paragraph 3 of the charter of the Development Bank and that Jordan would now put in J.D. 150,000 and would like to have another member on the Board, making 2 Jordan Government, 1 private bank, and 3 UNRWA. The possible effects of agreeing to this were being studied in relation to the fact that UNRWA held a veto right on the loan committee. Further, there was a meeting about the Yarmuk on Tuesday and he hoped for a report shortly giving a scheme in which Great Britain's contribution of £4.4 million might perhaps be used.

15. BUDGET

Locke said he had just received a telegram asking UNRWA only to budget for a quarter or at the most half a year, since under their present terms Adcom. could not approve £22 million for relief, while if it confirmed £18 million, it might adversely affect the money for reintegration.

16. I find it difficult to judge whether, as Blandford implies, Selo

/is

is quite sincere about wishing to settle the refugees, intends to do so, but quakes in his shoes at the thought of his people knowing he is going to settle the refugees unless he can show a clear "bribe" of £200 million for the Syrians, or whether this latest move is just another in the long train of procrastination - and a very profitable one at that.

17. It is at last clear that Syria cannot possibly lose on it. If UNRWA withdraws from area Syria will still have a very small number of refugees and they will all have been housed at U.N. expense. If she does not withdraw Selo will have less trouble with his refugees than most people as, in addition to large numbers having work, they will all be housed as well. It looks as though any really serious resettlement is a very long way ahead indeed. Much will depend on whether Depage is able to report a real resettlement plan (under whatever name) or whether it is housing pure and simple.

18. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Thomas Rapp, Montagu-Pollock and Furlonge.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/19

FROM

Mr Myers, Beirut to Mr Evans.

No. AC.100.

Dated

Received in Registry— 6.6.52. 11.6.52.

Negotiations with Syria.

The Syrian Land Dept will let UNRWA chose from all available State domains the areas most suitable for resettlement. Mr Blandford considers that the Syrians intend to undertake the larger plan of taking 150,000 families.

(Minutes)

(Copied) Fayed, Damascus, Amma, Sir H. Knight.

Encouraging.

Copy to Treasury (Col. Russell Edmunds) Watson 13/6.

Eastern Dept (J. Wardrop) c.a.

27/6 17/6

2 pps

CW 30/6.

Last Paper

References

-/18

(Print)

(How disposed of)

JR-Edmunds, Tsy. 25 June

(Action completed)

(Index)

18/7

Next Paper

36206

(AC 100)

SECRET

c/o British Legation,

BEIRUT.

6th June, 1952.

E 1825/19

/ E 1825/18

Dear Evans,

Please refer to my letter (AC 100) of the 29th May since writing which I have seen Blandford and Simone, Depage's deputy at Damascus, as well as Wakefield in our Legation.

2. I find that no one in Damascus has any doubt that the scheme for "improvement of refugee living conditions" is intended to be full agricultural resettlement of refugees in camps within Syria. In fact, Simone informed me that the Lands Department would let them choose from all available State domains the areas most suitable for this purpose.

3. Blandford tells me that when Locke was talking with Shishakly, the latter told him in passing that the question of the refugees was settled. Locke did not take up this remark, but Blandford considers that it points to the fact that the Syrians intend to undertake the larger plan of taking 150,000 families. Apart from this, he has no news on the subject.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Sir Henry Knight, Sir Thomas Rapp, Montague-Pollock and Furlonge.

Yours sincerely,

(O.H. MYERS)

T.E. Evans, Esq., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E1825/20

FROM

F.O. Minute
(Mr Richmond)

No.

Dated 14.8.52

Received in Registry— 16.8.52

Negotiations with Syria.

Discusses Syria's request for membership of the Advisory Commission

Last Paper

References

EE7826/65.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes)

E. Dept.
PaR.
20/8

JWBM
18/8

(Action completed)

21/8

(Index)

10/10

Next Paper

37330

Entry E E7825/20

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UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY.

The attached telegram from Myers, Sir Henry Knight's Assistant on the Advisory Commission to the U.N.R.W.A. reports that, in an interview with Blandford and Locke on the 12th August, Shishakly asked for membership of the Advisory Commission for Syria.

2. If this is a genuine request, it appears to mark a great step forward and, subject to Sir Henry Knight's views, I suggest that Syria's request should be granted. There appears to be no technical difficulty since paragraph 8 of the General Assembly resolution of the 8th December, 1949, which established the U.N.R.W.A., gives the Advisory Commission "power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments". It will, of course, be necessary to check whether Syria is a contributing Government within the meaning of this resolution.

3. The advantages of having an Arab Government represented on the Advisory Commission and thus committed to a share in the responsibility for relief and resettlement of refugees seem to me to outweigh considerably any disadvantages that having an Arab member on the Commission are bound to bring. As Myers suggests, the accession of Syria to the Advisory Commission might very well bring in Jordan and Egypt also. This would make the Advisory Commission rather unwieldy but I feel sure that the direct association of Arab Governments in the work of the U.N.R.W.A. outweighs any disadvantages.

4. It would certainly be well to adopt Myers' suggestion that, before accepting Syria, some pressure should be applied to Syria to settle outstanding difficulties and to give some assurance of her intentions to carry out the programme of resettlement of refugees from outside Syria.

J.C.B. Richmond

Sir James Bowker. has seen.

(J.C.B.Richmond.)
Middle East Secretariat.
14th August 1952.

SECRET

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Chapman Andrews

D. 5.36 p.m. 13th August, 1952

No. 462

13th August, 1952

R. 7.40 p.m. 13th August, 1952

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 462 of 13th August

Repeated for information to U.K. Del. New York
Washington
Paris
Ankara.

From Myers for Waterlow and Knight.

On 12th August Blandford and Locke met Shishakly. The latter agreed to start immediately the $30,000,000 programme for refugees in Syria, particularly a survey of water resources, but putting off indefinitely the full programme and large project referred to in my letter ACI of the 7th August.

2. Syria also asked for membership of the Advisory Commission. Locke said that it was a most interesting suggestion and that he would refer it to his colleagues.

3. Locke's personal reaction is enthusiastic, and he informs me that [gp. undec.]s' was the same, on the grounds that Syria, so far our most difficult country, will be associated with the Agency's work and so our major problem will be overcome. He had not yet seen the Turkish member. He wished to report home my personal reactions. I said that these were very mixed and that I thought the matter needed careful study.

4. The following are some first comments most of which I put to Locke:

(a) If Syria's intentions are sincere it might well bring a great improvement. The Damascus Legation informed me some time ago that Syrians cannot bear anyone operating in their territory whom they do not in some way control

(b) The other Arab states will presumably apply and we should have to accept two more, presumably Jordan and Egypt,

/to bring us to

SECRET

Beirut telegram No. 462 to Foreign Office.

to bring us to full strength.

(c) Pakistan would be offended though we could quote the special position of the Arab states.

(d) The self styled Refugee Leaders would start strong agitation for representation.

(e) Jordan or Egypt might send, say, the ex-Mufti.

(f) If we refuse her admission Syria will probably not cooperate in resettlement.

(g) Therefore if we accept we should first apply pressure to settle all outstanding difficulties.

(h) Should we insist on major programme agreement before acceptance?.

(j) I gather from other sources that we shall probably get only third grade land for refugees as the remainder is wanted for peasants and tribal settlements. Settling this land will take long, and be costly. Should we demand to settle on private land?

5. I said Knight would probably bring your reply.

Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Del. New York, Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 5, 10 and 11 respectively.

[Repeated to U.K. Del. New York, Washington and Paris].

DISTRIBUTED TO
Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat

ADVANCE COPIES
Head of Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat

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1952

E

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/21

FROM
Sir C. Steel
Washington

No. 1730.
Dated 10. 9. 52.
Received in Registry— 12. 9. 52.

Syrian membership of Ad Com

The Syrian M.F.A. has sent a formal letter to the Chairman of the Ad. Com. Gives State Dept preliminary views.

Last Paper.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Dft Mr Bailey, W. Ra
for Mr Richmond,
13 Sept.
Copy) Sir H. Knight, Beirut
Damascus
Bagdad
Beirut
Cairo
BMCO Fayid.
13 Sept.

(Action completed.) [signature] 1/10

(Index.) [initials] 16/10

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

We have not yet seen the formal letter

The State Depts preliminary views are in line with ours. See my letter of 27th Aug. to Damascus at EE 1826/65.

We now await the result of State Depts consultation with their ME posts, after which the matter will presumably be discussed by Blandford with Adcom and an agreed dft reply to Syria referred to us.

Dft to Washington.

J.W.B. Richmond
13/9

J.W.B.R.
29/9

31401 F.O.P.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

E 1825/21

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir C. Steel
No. 1730
10th September, 1952

D. 6.32 p.m. 11th September, 1952
R. 2.15 a.m. 12th September, 1952

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1730 of 10th September

Repeated for information to Beirut, Damascus, Amman

and Saving to Cairo, Bagdad, U.K. Del. New York

U.N.R.W.A.

State Department showed us today text of a formal letter from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Chairman of Advisory Commission requesting Syrian membership of A.D.C.O.M.

2. State Department are consulting their Middle East posts. Meanwhile their preliminary reaction is that whilst they appreciate there are various objections, they think it may be inadvisable to turn down this request if it is to be a means of securing practical Syrian cooperation over resettlement. In that event it might be necessary to modify somewhat the functions of A.D.C.O.M., although they had not considered this point in detail. Further increases in membership could they thought be resisted by reserving this for states which are effectively cooperating in the resettlement of refugees. This would mean in practice Syria and Jordan. (State Department said that United States Embassy, Damascus, quoting Depage, had reported that Syrian agreement for settlement of 20,000 refugee families in Syria was now "guaranteed".)

Foreign Office please pass to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Saving to Cairo and Bagdad as my telegrams Nos. 18, 17, 16, 69 and 65 respectively.

[Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, and Saving to Cairo and Bagdad].

DISTRIBUTED TO:
U.N. Economic and Social Department
Eastern Department
Middle East Secretariat
K K K K

12 SEP 1952

EE 1825/21

Middle East Secretariat,
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

13th September, 1952.

OUTFILE

We are glad to see from your telegram No. 1730 of the 10th September that the State Department's preliminary views on admitting Syria to the Advisory Commission of the U.N.R.W.A. accord with ours (see my letter to Montagu-Pollock EE 1826/65 of the 27th August).

2. We assume that the State Department will instruct Locke as soon as they have consulted their Middle Eastern posts. The next step would then be for Blandford and the Advisory Commission to draft a reply to the Syrian Government, which they will presumably refer to ADCOM. Governments before despatching.

3. We are sending a copy of this letter to Sir Henry Knight, and to the Chanceries at Damascus, Bagdad, Beirut, Amman and Cairo, and to B.M.E.O. (Fayid).

R. W. Bailey, Esq.,
British Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

(J.C.B.Richmond.)

File Number:—

1952

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

PALESTINE

E E 1825/22

FROM

F. O. Minute
(Sir G. Bowker)

No.

Dated 11. 9. 52.

Received in Registry— 13. 9. 52.

Syria's admission to Ad. Com.

Record of a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador.

Last Paper

References

-/21

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Copy) Sir H. Knight, Beirut
Beirut
Ankara,
W. Van,
Paris - 23 Sept.

(Action completed) 23/10

(Index) 10/10

Next Paper

(Minutes)

Hard 16/9

W. & S. Dept. 18/10

Copy to Sir H. Knight, Beirut, Ankara, Washington & Paris.

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U.N.R.W.A.

The Turkish Ambassador called this afternoon to talk about Syria's application for admission to the Advisory Commission of U.N.R.W.A. He recalled that not long ago a similar application by Pakistan had been turned down. The French Government had now asked the Turkish Government for their views about the recent application made by Syria and the Ambassador had been instructed to ascertain the views of Her Majesty's Government.

After consulting Miss Waterlow, who joined us, I told the Ambassador that this question had been discussed with Sir Henry Knight, the British representative on the Advisory Commission, a few weeks ago, before his return to Beirut. The directive given to him was that Syria's application should be judged in the light of the effect which its acceptance might have on her readiness to co-operate in the work of the re-settlement of the refugees. We should try to make her admission conditional on her agreeing to absorb some of the refugees outside Syria, but it might be to our advantage to admit her on her own terms, since her admission in itself would be tantamount to accepting some responsibility towards a solution of the refugee problem. Other applications which might follow should similarly be considered on their merits. Sir Henry Knight would now be discussing the question with his colleagues and no doubt with the Director, and we were awaiting his report, in the light of which we should have to decide finally what our attitude should be. We might at that stage wish to consult the other Governments concerned.

The Ambassador asked how we should deal with a similar application from Israel. I said that Israel was in a different position from Syria in that the Agency was not responsible for any Arab refugees in Israel. Therefore an application from Israel was unlikely.

The Ambassador thanked us for the information which he had been given and said that he would report accordingly to his Government.

R. J. B.

11th September, 1952.

Middle East Secretariat (Copy E. Dept.)

Negotiations with Arab governments to secure their support for the UN resolutions on refugees and on the Palestine question; admission of Syria and Jordan to the UNRWA Advisory Commission (ADCOM). Code EE file 1825 (papers 1 to 22). 1952. MS Refugee Records from the General Correspondence Files of the Political Departments of the Foreign Office, Record Group 371, 1947-1970 FO 371/98508. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom).